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GO WORLD
 MARCH No.24
 APRIL 1981

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The cover: Portrait of a 14th century general drawing inspiration from the go board, by Kuniyoshi (1797 — 1861), the last great artist of the ukiyoe school. Published between 1847 and 1850. (Collection of William Pinckard)

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Shuko follows up his triumph in the Kisei title by defeating Takagi to win the NHK Cup. Participating in the post-game analysis is Sakata Eio.

Fujisawa Shuko Defends Kisei, Wins NHK Cup

Fujisawa Shuko has further extended his magnificent record in the Kisei tournament by defeating this year's challenger, Otake Hideo, 4–0. Shuko has monopolised this title since its inception five years ago and is now eligible for the title of Honorary Kisei when he retires.

Shuko usually spends the rest of the year celebrating once he defends the title, but this year he kept himself fighting fit for the final of the 28th NHK Cup. He scored an easy win over Takagi Shoichi, then 8-dan, and thus won this title for the second time, his previous win being in 1968.

Otake Defends Judan Title

Otake Hideo has made a quick recovery from his debacle in the Kisei title and has defended his Judan title with three straight wins over the challenger, Hashimoto Shoji of the Kansai Ki-in. Hashimoto was a little unlucky, for the games were very close. The second one was decided by half a point and the first would have been decided

by the same margin but for a one-point slip by Hashimoto in the endgame. This is Otake's third Judan title. The results:

Game 1 (4th March). Otake (B) won by 1½ points.

Game 2 (19th March). Otake (W) won by ½ point.

Game 3 (1st April). Otake (B) won by resignation.

Cho Chikun Becomes Honinbo Challenger with Perfect Score in League

Cho Chikun's marvellous form is continuing and this year also he looks like the most dangerous player on the tournament scene. So far this year he has the impressive record of 18 wins to 3 losses. Cho has also scored seven straight wins in the Honinbo league, the first perfect record in the history of the league. Takemiya Honinbo will have to look to his laurels in the title match.

Rin Kaiho (5–2), Kato Masao (3–4) and Sakata Eio (3–4) retained their places in the league, while Hashimoto Shoji, Honda Kuniyoshi and Sakai Takeshi, all with 3–4 scores, and Shirashi (1–6) dropped out. Six of the eight players



A crucial victory – Otake takes the second game of the 19th Judan title match by the narrowest of margins and Hashimoto Shoji looks understandably crestfallen. Watching in the foreground is Ishii Shinzo 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in and the game recorder is Ashida Isoko 4-dan, also of the Kansai Ki-in.

had minus records, which is most unusual. Placings in case of ties are determined by the player's rank in the league.

Late news. Cho has made a good start by winning the first two games of the title match.

Kato Leads Meijin League

This year Kato seems to have his best chance of becoming the Meijin challenger, for he has started with five straight wins, while his main rival, former Meijin Otake Hideo, has suffered a painful

36th Honinbo League

Rank	Name	K	R	S	C	H	S	H	S	Score
1	Kato	—	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3 — 4
2	Rin	1	—	1	0	1	1	1	0	5 — 2
3	Sakata	1	0	—	0	0	1	0	1	3 — 4
4	Cho	1	1	1	—	1	1	1	1	7 — 0
5	Hashimoto S.	1	0	1	0	—	0	0	1	3 — 4
5	Shiraishi	0	0	0	0	1	—	0	0	1 — 6
5	Honda K.	0	0	1	0	1	1	—	0	3 — 4
5	Sakai	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	—	3 — 4

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

6th Meijin League (as of 22nd May)

Rank	Name	O	K	T	R	K	S	Sh	Y	S	Score
1	Otake	—		1	1	1	0			1	4 — 1
2	Kato		—	1	1			1	1		4 — 0
3	Takemiya	0	0	—		1	1		1		3 — 2
4	Rin	0	0		—	1	1	1			3 — 2
5	Kobayashi	0		0	0	—	1			1	2 — 3
6	Sakata	1		0	0	0	—			1	2 — 3
7	Shimamura		0		0			—	1	0	1 — 3
7	Yamabe		0	0				0	—	0	0 — 4
7	Sato	0				0	0	1	1	—	2 — 3

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

loss to Sakata Eio. These two are a step ahead of the rest of the field, but Takemiya and Rin are not yet out of the running.

Honda Sachiko Wins Women's Championship


Honda Sachiko 6-dan has made a comeback in the title which she won four times in the late 1960's and 1970's. She defeated the champion, Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan, 2—1 in the 27th Women's Championship, also known as the Women's Honinbo title. Ogawa had held the title for two years running.

TV Haya-go

Otake Hideo, whose nickname is 'the god of haya-go', has been doing well in the television tournaments. In the Kakusei tournament, which virtually had to be replayed as a knockout tournament when the five-man league ended in a five-way draw, Otake defeated Cho Chikun in the final to take the title. Otake also won the Japan Asia Air Lines Cup, in which he met Sakata in the final. This takes his total of titles won to twenty-five, putting him in a distant second place after Sakata's sixty-two.



The challenger, Honda Sachiko 6-dan (right), defeats Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan in the first game of the 27th Women's Championship (Women's Honinbo).



Nakamura Yutaro 9-dan

Promotion Record I

Nakamura Yutaro has created a new record by winning promotion to 9-dan at the age of 73. The previous record was held by Hayashi Yutaro (at eighty-one the oldest active player), who reached 9-dan at the age of sixty-nine. Nakamura earned the points for promotion by winning his oteai game on the 19th March, but he did not realise that he had qualified for 9-dan until it was pointed out by his disciple Kurosawa Tadanao 8-dan. He becomes the thirty-fifth 9-dan at the Nihon Ki-in (there are twenty-one at the Kansai Ki-in).

Nakamura was born in 1908 and became shodan in 1928, reaching 8-dan in 1965. He played in the 3rd (1957) and 4th Top Position leagues and the 3rd Meijin league (1964).

Promotion Record II

A contrasting record has been created by Cho Chikun, who has become the youngest player to be promoted to 9-dan at the Nihon Ki-in. In an oteai game played on the 21st April, Cho secured the points for promotion by defeating Takagi Shoichi, who also had promotion to 9-dan at stake. It was actually a very tough game for Cho and he was only able to win by one point holding black in the no-komi game. Takagi had to wait till the following week, when he got the necessary points by defeating Nakamura Shidehito 7-dan, again playing with white.

Cho, aged twenty-four, is the youngest player to make it at the Nihon Ki-in. Hashimoto Shoji reached 9-dan at the age of twenty-three at the Kansai Ki-in, but Cho would probably have also

equalled that record if the oteai had not been suspended last year at the Nihon Ki-in. Cho played a total of 110 games to reach 9-dan and his winning percentage was 80.5.



Other promotions

To 8-dan: Awaji Shuzo

To 6-dan: Kataoka Satoshi, Honda Sachiko

To Err is Human

Even professionals make amateurish mistakes, as demonstrated by the game below. Takagi Shoichi, then 8-dan, played White 1, hallucinating that Black would have to defend at 'a', after which he planned to capture the six black stones by playing 'b'. His opponent, Kori 6-dan, just played 2, setting up a ladder and Takagi resigned on the spot. White should have played 1 at 2. Takagi is known for his careless blunders ('poka'), but actually Kori thought that White was still in the game even after this mistake.



By way of apology to Takagi for reproducing the above blunder, we present a game which is probably a happier memory for him. Black 1 in the figure above is a brilliant attacking move —



Hugh Bellamy 8-kyu of Richard Huish College plays a move against Robert Burgess 7-kyu of Leeds Grammar School in the final round.

the conventional concept would be to attack with Black 'a'. From the point of view of the two ▲ stones, Black 1 could be regarded as the centre of symmetry and thus the vital point. It worked excellently here and the continuation to 11 set up a won position. His opponent, Haruyama 8-dan, commented that he should have played more aggressively, extending at 11 with 10.

1981 Montreal-Honinbo

With a perfect 5-0 score in the 1981 Montreal-Honinbo League, Louis Leroux 5-dan won the right to challenge Osamu Yokota 5-dan, the 1980 title-holder. However, Mr. Yokota won the title match 2-1 and became the Second Montreal-Honinbo.

2nd British Schools Go Championships

This event was held on the 1st March at Kings Norton Boys School in Birmingham and twelve teams from eleven schools participated in the four round tournament. Last year's champions, Leeds Grammar School, defended its title by winning all four of its matches and thus once again won the Castledine Trophy. Second was Richard Huish

College and third was Kings Norton 'A' Team.

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3rd World Amateur Go Championship

This year's championship was a triumph for a youthful Chinese team which almost equalled the Chinese domination of the top places in the first tournament. Twenty-two year old Shao is the new world amateur champion, while his sixteen year old team-mate Ma came second, losing the final to Shao by just half a point. The third member of the Chinese team, the twenty year old Liu, took fifth place. Murakami Bunsho barely salvaged Japan's honour by coming in third. Western players repeated their fine performance of last year, with Ron Synder of the U. S. winning 7th place and Terry Stacey of the U. K. following him in 8th. The full placings:

- 1st: Shao Zhen-zhong
- 2nd: Ma Xiao-chung
- 3rd: Murakami Bunsho
- 4th: Park Sang-don
- 5th: Liu Xiao-guang
- 6th: Park Yoon-suh
- 7th: Ron Synder
- 8th: Terence Stacey
- 9th: Moon Il-doo
- 10th: Hai-chow Chen
- 11th: Hirata Hironori
- 12th: Keiji Shimizu



1981 World Amateur Champion – Zhen-zhong Shao

Tournament charts are given on page 9 and we will present some of the most interesting games in our next issue.

At a meeting of officials during the tournament it was decided to form the World Go League for the purpose of coordinating go activities, such as this tournament, around the world. For the time being, the Nihon Ki-in has volunteered to perform the administrative work for the League. We will keep readers posted on developments.



Shao of China meets his fellow countryman Ma in the final of the championship. Shao gained victory by half a point in a seesawing game.



Robert Rehm of Holland defeats Barry Phease of New Zealand in the 1st round of the Main Tournament.




Juan Garcia de la Banda of Spain loses to Andre Moussa of France in the 1st round of the Losers Tournament.




A convivial moment – Robert Rehm (Holland), Kobayashi Chizu 5-dan, Ron Synder (U. S. A.) and Takemiya Honinbo


Main Tournament



Losers Tourn. (i) Losers Tournament (ii)



Playoff for 5th place



Not listed in the charts are the following play-offs:

- 3rd place) Murakami defeated Park
- 7th place) Synder defeated Stacey
- 11th place) Hirata defeated Shimizu

Special Game Commentary

Hashimoto Shoji v. Kobayashi Koichi

One of the minor rivalries that occasionally arise in the professional tournaments was the recent series of three games between Hashimoto Shoji of the Kansai Ki-in and Kobayashi Koichi of the Nihon Ki-in. The first game determined which of the two would play in the Honinbo league. The other two games determined which would challenge Otake for the Judan title. The results were somewhat one-sided: Hashimoto won all three games. The second game is given below, together with questions (in italics) sent in by readers of *Gekkan Gogaku* and answers by Hashimoto.

Black: Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan

White: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

date: 13th November, 1980; komi: 5½

19th Judan, winners' section final





Figure 1 (1 - 21)

Figure 1 (1 - 21)

Instead of 6, why doesn't White play 1, 3, and 5 in Dia. 1?

Without Black 2 in Dia. 1, White would have room for a two-space extension from 'a' to 'b' between the circled and triangled stones. Black 2 eliminates this extension and gives Black an ideal structure, so White would prefer to avoid Dia. 1. That is why he played 6 at the bottom.




Dia. 1

Can White play 6 a line higher, on the star point?

Yes, and the choice between White 6 and the star-point is a matter of taste, not a question of better or worse. (See however Dia. 3.)

Could White pincer Black 7 by playing 8 at 9?




Dia. 2

Yes. Dia. 2 shows the natural continuation, and this would be a possible game. White 11, however, suffers from the drawback pointed out in Dia. 1, so this variation is not completely satisfactory for White.

How about White 10 at 1 in Dia. 3?

Excellent move.

Since 1 would be an ideal point for Black in this low Chinese-style opening, White's taking it away from him is also good. One can picture the continuation through Black 22 (although White might not connect at 21). Given this continuation, however, it would seem better to have the triangled stone up on the star-point.



Dia. 3


21: connects

Why did Black play 11?


In the game I played against Kobayashi to get into the Honinbo league, I played Black 11 at 'a'. I chose Black 11 this time partly for a change. Another factor was that Black 11, by undermining White's base, makes it difficult for him to extend to 'b'. A third factor was that if Black

plays 11 at 'a', followed by White 'c', Black 'd', White 'b', he faces long-term worries about White 'e'.

Instead of White 12, what about White 1 or White 'a' in Dia. 4?



Dia. 4



Dia. 5


It is true that White 1 is a weak point of the corner formation made by the triangled stone, but in this situation, Black will separate White with 2 and 4 and fight. The two circled stones work well, and White is in trouble.

White 1 at 'a' would give Black too easy a development. (Black answers at 'b'.)


Why not play White 12 at 1 in Dia. 5?

The continuation through 5 makes White over-concentrated. If the usual sequence is for Black to play the triangled stone at 2, followed by White 3, Black 4, White 5, then the exchange of White 1 for ▲ is clearly advantageous to Black, because it ends the threat of White 'a'.

For White 12, I suggest White 1 in Dia. 6.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

The sequence from 1 to 5 gives White a nice shape, but it lacks vigor. If White is to counter the aggressive spirit of Black's triangled stone, then perhaps 12 is his only choice.

What if Black plays 13 at 1 in Dia. 7?


White may pressure him with 2 and 4. The question is whether or not Black can fight by

pushing through and cutting (Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c').


Can White play 14 at 15?

No, because that would give Black a good opportunity to play 'f'.

I see that if White fails to answer Black 15, he'll have trouble dealing with Black 16, but can't he play 16 at 1 in Dia. 8?



Dia. 8




Dia. 9

I was planning to answer that with Black 2. Through 4, Black does well at the top, and later on he may be able to crunch White with 'a'. Other possible sequences, like Black 2 at 3, White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 2, White 'e', Black 'f', get a bit difficult.

Instead of White 18, how about White 1 in Dia. 9?

Black will be happy to reply with 2 and 4.

Could Black play 21 at 1 in Dia. 10?



Dia. 10

That would give Black a good position on the upper side, but White 2 is a good point for the whole board. It burdens Black with the threat of being cut by White 'a', Black 'b',

White 'c'. The one-space jumps into the center were essential for both sides. With 22, White should have kept jumping to 'g'.





Figure 2 (22 - 39)

Figure 2 (22 - 39)

Why doesn't White play 22 at 26?

Because that gives Black too easy a reply: Black 34, White 22, Black 'a'.


What if White plays 24 at 1 in Dia. 11?



Dia. 11

Black defends with 2 and 4. White isn't accomplishing anything, and Black has 'a' left for later.


What if White plays 26 at 1 in Dia. 12?



Dia. 12

If he follows with White 3, Black 4 causes him trouble. If he plays 3 at 'a', Black replies at 'b' and White gets zilch.


Suppose White cross-cuts with 26 at 1 in Dia. 13?



Dia. 13


14: connects

Intuitively, one expects that if White fights where Black is stronger, Black will get the better result, but the actual fight is surprisingly difficult. If Black makes his most stubborn resistance with 2 and 4, White will squeeze at 9 and so on, then split the top with 15 and 17, and if Black fails to answer 17, White 'a' leads to a ko. This is insufferable for Black. His best course seems to be to play Black 2 in Dia. 14, getting the result shown through 12.




Dia. 14

What happens if White cuts across by playing 30 at 1 in Dia. 15?




Dia. 15 10: connects

Black cuts him off with 2 and ultimately contains him at 14. White's group is in for a rough time, and in the top left Black still has a large invasion at 'a'. Note that if the 'b-c' exchange were on the board, then instead of cutting at 5, White could descend with 5 in Dia. 16 and get into the upper side with 7. He could not do this without the triangled exchange, however. If he plays 'b' in Dia. 15, Black replies at 'd', not 'c'.



Dia. 16


Why doesn't Black play 31 at 1 in Dia. 17?



Dia. 17

White captures two stones in sente with 2 to 6, and Black is left with an annoying weakness at 'a'.

What if White plays 32 at 1 in Dia. 18?



Dia. 18

Black defends with 2 and 4. This is not such a good result for White. If White moves 1 to 'a', Black chops at 3.

The outcome through 35 is a catastrophe for White. Couldn't he have done anything to avoid it?


Although many questioners echoed your sentiments, the catastrophe was not as great as everyone thought. Kobayashi's evaluation was, 'Through Black 35, I'd grade White's position as "fair". He's split the top, and Black's outer wall is thin. The exchange of jumps into the center is satisfactory to White because it raises the value of the triangled stone in Figure 2.'

Perhaps most professionals would take a dimmer view of White's performance through 35. At the very least, Black has nothing to complain of. Black's lead, however, is not decisive. Perhaps one should say that Black has the potential to take the lead if he can find the right way to attack the white group in the future. As we shall see, Black later got the attacking sequence wrong and around move 78, the lead shifted to White.


Isn't White 36, pushing into a knight's move, a mistake?

Right now Black will answer at 37. Then White can block at 'b' with the threat of capturing at 'c', which may help him save his group later on. If he waited until his group was involved in a life-or-death struggle and then played 36, Black would answer at 'c' and White 'b' would lose its effect.

How about playing White 38 at 1 in Dia. 19?



Dia. 19



Dia. 20

That's too blunt; it doesn't leave any potential for later. Black 2, 4, and 6 make Black's position too safe and secure.

White 38 left a weakness at 'd'. Why not White 1 in Dia. 20 instead?

Black will build up his territory with the shoulder move at 2, followed by the double hane at 4 and 8. Advantage — Black.

What would Black 'e' or 'f' look like instead of Black 39?

Black 'e' would leave a weakness at the 3-3 point. Black 'f' would secure the corner, but

in the Chinese fuseki, Black should play toward the sides and center rather than try to secure the corner. Black 39, aiming at Black 'd', was the correct move.





Figure 3 (40 - 78)

Figure 3 (40 - 78)

Shouldn't White play 40 at 1 in Dia. 21?

You've asked the kind of question that professionals consider seriously; Kobayashi thought about it for 40 minutes. The expected continuation from White 1 in Dia. 21 (according to Kobayashi) is 2 to 13, and since the triangled stone is low, I think Black has no cause for dissatisfaction. Notice that White draws back with 7 in Dia. 21, while he made a double hane in the actual game. This change in tactics is due to the one-line difference between White 1 and White 40. If White pulled White 1 further back — to 'a' or 'b'—Black would invade the side at 13 instead of the corner at 2, because from 13 he would have room for a two-space extension to 'c'.



Dia. 21

What was the purpose of Black 41?


The 3-3 point is the main vulnerability of a star-point stone. In particular, when your opponent makes a double-wing extension from a star-point stone, you should invade at the 3-3

point immediately. In this game, Black would be in real trouble if he let White close the corner with 43.

Shouldn't White block on the wider side, at 43 instead of 42?

There are two rules about blocking from the star-point: one says to block on the wider side; the other says to block on the higher side. White Δ is one line wider than White 40, but White 40 is one line higher (on the fourth line). Also, if you look beyond White 40, the left side is wider than the lower side.

Could Black play 47 at 1 in Dia. 22?




Dia. 22

I hesitated over this considerably. My reason for finally choosing Black 47 was that I didn't like the thickness and territory that White gets on the lower side in the sequence through 8 in Dia. 22.

Could White play 50 at 'a'?

He could, followed by Black 51, White 'b', Black 46, but the resulting thickness would not work well in this game.

Can't White take sente with 1 in Dia. 23, then proceed to 3?




Dia. 23

As far as sente goes, Black can just ignore White 1. White then captures at 2, having to use two stones (1 and 2) to get what he could have gotten with one (White 1 at 2). Also, if Black plays 2, followed by White 'a' and Black 'b', White loses about fifteen points as compared with the figure and is left without secure eye shape on the outside. In the figure it was Black whose four stones were left insecure. That

makes a big difference.

With 53, what if Black invades at 1 in Dia. 24?




Dia. 24


Kobayashi said he was planning to switch to 2 and 4, then switch back to 6, play the sequence through 18, and count on his defensive skills after that. If Black plays 5 at 14, White would play 6 at 7, leaving himself a potential life in the corner with the hane at 5. The reason for White 2 and 4 is that if White answers Black 1 directly at 6, he can't cope with Black 7, while if he answers it directly at 7, Black gets too much territory by playing 6.

Since White had Dia. 24 in reserve, he should have played 54 at 'c' in the figure, leaving the bottom open but defending the top left corner and taking aim at Black's thinness.

Can't White attack by playing 54 at 1 in Dia. 25?




Dia. 25



Dia. 26

Black fights back with 2 and 4. White has no good way to conclude the attack. If he cuts by playing 5 as in Dia. 26, Black plays out the sequence from 6 to 16. Next White connects at 1 in Dia. 27



Dia. 27


and Black connects at 2, capturing the corner. White gets four stones with 11, but the exchange favors Black.

Instead of Black 65, why not Black 1 in Dia. 28?


White would connect his groups with 2 to 8. Next he could plunge into Black's lower right area with no fear.

I put a great deal of thought into Black 65. Unfortunately, I followed it with a horrible blunder at Black 67. Without playing 67,

I should have gone directly to 69, or 1 in Dia. 29. If White played 2, I could attack his large group




Dia. 28



Dia. 29

with 3, 5, and 7, then, after the fighting died down, return to take care of the three stones on the left side with, for example, Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e'.

White 68 upset the game by enabling White to follow with 72 and 74. Before playing 75, I looked for a long time for a way to attack White's group, but couldn't find anything that worked. Black 1 in Dia. 30 fails because of the tesuji at 6, which captures Black 3 and 5.



Dia. 30

When White broke into my territory with 76 and 78 and simultaneously stabilized his own group, he forged into the lead. My chances of being able to give the komi looked remote.

What chance I did have now lay in using my three stones on the left side to attack the white group above them.




Figure 4 (79 - 119)


Figure 4 (79 - 119)

Can't Black ignore White 80 and cut at 82?

Perhaps I should have done that; Kobayashi said afterward that he was worried about it. I was still perturbed at losing my chance to attack on the right and was determined not to lose my chance to attack on the left — that was why I played 81. The 80–81 exchange was a forcing exchange for White, which helped him to stay linked together.

What happens if Black plays 87 at 1 in Dia. 31, then cuts at 3?

After White 4 and 6, it won't turn out as Black hopes. The tri-angled exchange helps White quite a bit, and his top left group will not die.



Dia. 31

Black lost points with 93 to 97. He should just have played 99.

Not so. Just Black 99, followed by White 93, would be better for White than the actual game. Black 93 to 97 were forcing moves made in preparation for 99, and they gained profit despite White's playing 98 and 100.


With 99, why doesn't Black take the ko at 'a'?

White would answer at 119, gaining both profit and security. Black's territorial loss would be large. If White had omitted 100, however, I would then have played 'a' and made life fairly

uncomfortable for him.


With 101, why doesn't Black attack White's top left corner, and with 102, why doesn't White play 1 in Dia. 32?

To answer your second question first, if White plays 1 in Dia. 32, Black executes the sequence from 2 to 16. In other words, Black 101 made Black 103 in the figure and Black 2 in Dia. 32 miai. For Black, it was better to play for miai like this than to play 101 directly in the corner and gain only a halfway result.



Dia. 32

How about playing White 110 at 1 in Dia. 33?




Dia. 33

That is a very astute suggestion. Did you perchance read the commentary on this game in the *Sankei Shimbun*? Kobayashi considered White 110 his biggest mistake of the game. If he had cut at 1 in Dia. 33 before Black 'a', Black would have had to reply at 2, and then White could have played 3 (110 in the figure). Black 'b', White 'c' would be expected afterward, and White would still have his lead.

After Black 111, if White tried to cut at 1 in Dia. 34, Black would have a good defense in 2, 4, and 6. The game was now extremely close.

Instead of 114, why doesn't White connect diagonally at 'b'?



Dia. 34

That would give Black a three-point sente hane at 'c'. In the actual game, Black 'c' is worth only two points in gote.





Figure 5 (120 - 179)

Figure 5 (120 - 179)

Why doesn't White use 20 to block at 'a'?

The idea of White 20 is to peep at 'b' in sente if Black answers at 'c', or to play 22 if Black answers at 21, then aim at White 50, Black 51, White 56, Black 'd', White 52, Black 23, White 57. (Black 23 defended against this threat.) At this stage, moves on the upper side are bigger than blocking at 'a'. White 'a' and White 36 are miai — approximately equal.


Instead of White 26, what about White 3 in Dia. 35?



Dia. 35

There is no profit in that for White; Black answers with 4, 6, and 8. Nor can White play 3 without exchanging 1 for 2, because then, after White 7, Black will be able to play 'a'.

The game-losing move turned out to be




Dia. 36

White 38, which White played without pause in reply to Black 37. He should of course have played in contact at 1 in Dia. 36. He may not have liked the hane at Black 'a', but he could answer that at 'b' and still get the same amount of corner territory as in the actual game. His retreating to 38 meant that after exchanging 41 for 42, Black could play 43, White 44, Black 58, getting both 43 and 58 in sente. (In actual play, he let White have 58.)

With the game almost exactly even, White 38 was fatal. Once Black played 39 and 45, the outcome was clear. White should apparently have played 46 at 47, but that would not have saved him from defeat.

If White played 64 at 1 in Dia. 37, what would the score be?



Dia. 37

Since Black would capture a stone with 2 and 4 in sente, he would win by about ten points minus the komi.

White 64 and the rest were played in search of a good place to resign. After Black 79, there was nothing more White could do.

White resigns at Black 179.

(*Gekkan Gogaku* April 1981. Translated by James Davies.)



6th Tengen Title

Kato Masao finished 1980 by successfully defending both his remaining titles: the Oza (GW23) and the Tengen. For the Tengen title he had to tackle Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan, and although making his first title challenge in 13 years, Yamabe approached this match in exceptionally good form. He had started the year with 11 straight wins, and at the point when he won the right to challenge, he had extended this to an amazing 20 wins against only two losses. He won the right to challenge, incidentally, when his opponent, Ushinohama Satsuo of the Kansai Ki-in, went to sleep in his room during the evening break and let his time run out. When a player is in good form, everything seems to go wrong for his opponents.

The first game of the best-of-five title series was played at a hot-spring hotel in Ishikawa Prefecture, in a room once occupied by the Emperor of Japan. A post-game discussion by the two players, translated from *Igo Club*, forms the commentary below.

Game One

Black: Kato Masao, Tengen & Oza

White: Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan

komi: 5½; November 12, 1980






Figure 1 (1 - 53)

Figure 1 (1 - 53)

Yamabe: Did I invade at White 12 too early? Well, I didn't know what to do in the lower right.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Kato: Perhaps it was too early. Why not cap at 1 in Dia. 1?

Yamabe: If Black answers at 'a', then White invades at 'b'. That makes sense. But I expect Black will answer at 2.

Kato: I was expecting White 3 through 7. That would make for a leisurely game. I was quite pleased with the result through Black 23.

Yamabe: Made the game insipid for White. What if White plays 1 and 3 in Dia. 2 instead of 26?

Kato: I was planning to thrust at 4. I dare say you wouldn't have liked that.


Yamabe: I certainly wouldn't have, which is why I made the contact play at 26, but I wonder if it was good. I thought of playing White 30 at 33, followed by Black 32, White 'a', Black 'b', and White 'c', but I decided it wouldn't turn out well if Black countered by giving atari at 30. I also considered clamping with White 30 at 'd', but ...

Kato: Anyway, the result through White 34 gave Black an easy game.

Yamabe: Black 35 to 41 were a nasty attack. I managed to live with White 42 and so on, but it's not a life I'm proud of. But I thought Black 53 was rather kind of you.

Kato: Right. It was thick, but otherwise worthless. I should have enclosed the center with 1 in Dia. 3. White 2 doesn't hurt at all; Black just answers at 3.

Yamabe: You could fit a pair of sumo wrestlers inside that ring of territory. Dia. 3 would have put you definitely ahead.



Dia. 3





Figure 2 (54 - 72)

Figure 2 (54 - 72)

Yamabe: Should I have answered Black 55 at 65?
Kato: Seems rather submissive. I was expecting White 56.

Yamabe: Yes, well, I played White 56 in the expectation of Black 57. Actually, I was worried about Dia. 4. Black 'a' in that diagram is sente, so Black can attack with 1 and so on. By having you play Black 57 and 61, I cleared up that bad



Dia. 4


potential.

Kato: Set your mind at rest by letting you play White 62, did I? But it may have been correct for Black anyway. The mistake was Black 67. That shoulder hit at 68 gave me a hard time.

Yamabe: I was thankful for Black 67. With you for an opponent, I expected to be capped by Black 1 in Dia. 5.

Kato: That was my first idea, but with you for an opponent, I was afraid White would escape lightly in some way, leaving me with nothing.

Yamabe: I was afraid that White would get lightly captured. As a practical problem, what should White do if Black caps at 1? In my usual irresponsible style, I'll suggest jumping to 2.



Dia. 5

Kato: Black would swoop over to 3.

Yamabe: If White defends at 4, I guess Black plays 5 to 13. This looks bad for White. His center group is never going to be out of trouble, and Black has enough territory to win on territory alone. If White plays 4 at 13, we get Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', but Black 'c' is unbearable for White.

Kato: Anyway, I had to attack at 1. If I don't attack there, all my thickness goes to waste.

Yamabe: If Black plays 1, perhaps White should ignore him and play 'd' — another of my irresponsible ideas.

Kato: Black still plays 3. If I had made the capping attack at 1, White would have been in quite a fix. I guess I was carrying respect for my opponent too far.




Figure 3 (73 - 100)

Figure 3 (73 - 100)


Kato: I made another mistake at Black 73. That knight's move has to be played more patiently at 1 in Dia. 6. Then Black still -

Yamabe: White turns at 2.

Kato: Black extends to 3.

Yamabe: If White plays 4, does Black 5 cause any trouble?

Kato: Just Black 5 and 7 make matters difficult enough for White. If White jumps to 'a', Black can wedge in at 'b'.




Dia. 6

Yamabe: White appears to have been taking profit, but he doesn't have any territory to speak of, and if even a little bit gets cut off, the game is down the drain. All this was true until I played White 74. When I played there, I began to feel optimistic.

Kato: Yes, it looked pretty bad for me. Well, that's what comes of making two mistakes.

After having to link up on a worthless point with 77 and let you take profit with 78, I had the game lost.

Yamabe: But then I made one of my typical blunders with 80. Who ever heard of peeping where you can't cut? Black 81 suddenly made White very thin. Should I have just jumped to 'a' in Dia. 7?



Dia. 7

Kato: Jumping to 'a' would provoke Black into playing Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. Why not force at 1, then defend at 3?

Yamabe: You're right, that looks good for White.

Kato: I went all out at Black 83 and 93.





Figure 4 (101 - 125)

Figure 4 (101 - 125)

Yamabe: Living with White 4 may have been too complacent. Perhaps I should have traded 1 for 2 in Dia. 8, then attacked at 3.

Kato: It looks dangerous for Black to answer



Dia. 8

at 5. He has to clamp 3 with 4.


Yamabe: Cutting with White 5 and 7 is big.

Kato: Black 10 and 12 make one eye.

Yamabe: Yes, but then it's still not too late for White to live at 13. Black 4 and 8 are weak, and there's a ko left: White 'a' to 'i'. I would have made this attack without hesitation if I had thought I was losing. The trouble was, I thought I was winning.

Kato: So Dia. 8 would have been decisive? If so, Black 3 in the figure was too greedy. However, I couldn't think of everything.

Yamabe: White 6 was incredible. White absolutely must have connected at 1 and 3 in Dia. 9. With Black ▲ on the board, you'd expect even a retarded player to see that.



Dia. 9


Kato: Black's short on eye shape unless he descends at 4. It makes a difference of four or five points.

Yamabe: What can you do if you go around giving away the komi? I reached out planning to play White 1 and 3 in Dia. 9, put the stone down and found I'd hanged at 6 in the figure. Talk about madness. I seriously considered resigning right there.

Kato: If you had played 1 and 3 in Dia. 9, I would definitely have lost.

Yamabe: Or at least the game would have been close. I was trying to do my best, but letting one's opponent get two good points like Black 5 and 7 is enough to ruin any game.

Kato: I never imagined I'd get to play Black 7. But even with it, I thought the game was still close. If you had played White 12 at 1 in Dia. 10, I was by no means sure of winning.



Dia. 10

Yamabe: Connect at 5, then play 7 — is that the idea? But I couldn't see the biggest point next. Blocking at 9 seems to lose by quite a bit.


Kato: Well, perhaps so.

Yamabe: I played White 12 and 14 to find a better way to lose.


Kato: The cut at Black 15 turned out exactly wrong for White, didn't it?

Kibitzer: What if White plays 24 at 'a'?

Yamabe: It doesn't work. Black plays 2 in Dia. 11, and since 6 is sente, he connects out with 10 to 14.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Kato: And at the point where White resigned, White 1 in Dia. 12 doesn't work either. Black wedges in at 2 and wins the capturing race by filling liberties with 8 and 10.

Yamabe: I'm ashamed of this game. I'm going to play more seriously next time.

White resigns at Black 125.

('Igo Club', January 1981. Translated by James Davies.)

Game Two

Black: Yamabe Toshiro

White: Kato Masao

komi: 5½; date: November 26, 1980

The second game of the match took place at the Nihon Ki-in in Ichigaya, Tokyo, one week after Kato had successfully defended his Oza title against Ishida. The following commentary is based on Kato's remarks to a go writer for 'Igo Club'.

Figure 1 (1 – 58)

Black 35. This move could also be at 'a'.

Black 37. If this move had been at the star-




Figure 1 (1 – 58)

point on the right, Kato had planned to jump out to 'b', a move which, he said, would feel good and has been seen in recent games.

White 38. Although this move leaves the center a little thin, Kato thought it was correct since moving out in tandem at 'c' is submissive and would allow Black to take the right-side star-point.

Black 39, White 40. These two moves caused some excitement as normally Black jumps out after White has closed the corner and White does not usually play 40 after Black has jumped out. Kato's opinion was that 39 was an excellent move because it aimed at attacking White's center group. As for his own move, he agreed that playing at the bottom was more regular, but since he did not know the best point to take, he played 40 aiming at the peep at 44 and also helping out his center stones. In the final analysis, both moves were played with White's center group in mind.

Black 47 – 53. Kato thought that Black's running in to 47 from 43 was a good move typical of Yamabe. Since answering at 53 would allow Black to force by pushing up at 'd', Kato played from the outside at 48. He also tended to agree with the professionals following the game that the exchange of Black 51 for White 52 was probably not good.

Figure 2 (59 – 101)

White 58 – 74. White's push-through at 58 in the last figure forced the issue and Black's reply at 59 made the sequence to the cut at 71 and the attachment at 72 a one-way street. However, the





Figure 2 (59 – 101)




Dia. 1 21: takes ko

extension at 73 is in the wrong direction and, according to Yamabe, should have been at 1 in Dia. 1. In this diagram, moving out at 7 makes the Black 59 – White 60 exchange a good one for Black, the result of which is that Black can build good thickness and surround the center with 25 through 29. In the actual game White's capture at 74 relieves all the pressure.

Black 83 – 93. Black 83 and 85 are a perfect example of a leaning attack. White has no choice but to answer at 86. If he tried to connect at 87, he would not be able to withstand being shut in by Black 'a'. The price for propping up his center group with 86, however, is that he must give way on the side. If he

tries to resist Black's push-through and cut with 1 in Dia. 2, Black will crawl at 4 and have him in trouble. If he still persists, Black 6 and 8 will catch one of the two groups. The result in the figure may seem terrible for White, but Kato thought there was no need for such



Dia. 2

pessimism. White could look forward to a ladder-block and the marked stone is not yet completely dead.

White 94. Kato thought that the attack here would be decisive, but he promptly made a mistake at 96. It was necessary to exchange 'b' for 'c' first, since later, when he tried to force, Black was able to stir up trouble by cutting at 'd' instead of answering directly at 'c'.




Figure 3 (101 – 136)


Figure 3 (101 – 136)

Black 11. Black lived easily at the top up to 17, but inserting 11 was a bad mistake as Black lost the severe cuts at 'a' and 'b'. Since he could have lived directly by playing 17, the effect of the added exchange was to lose nearly one move and perhaps the game.

White 20. Some observers thought invading at the three-three point might have been good, but Kato's opinion was that it would have been too soon. Even though he felt greatly relieved with 14 on the board, he was still concerned about a possible cut at 'b'.

White 26 – Black 29. White 26 is a ladder-block and Black 27 protects. Although the position is not altogether clear, White seems to be a little better after the attachment at 28. Black 29 is the proper move (honte) as it eliminates the aji of White 'c'.

Black 35. In Kato's opinion, Yamabe went astray here and should have followed Dia. 3. The shoulder hit at 7 is thick and after White 8 and 10, which gives White the sequence White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c'



Dia. 3

to aim at, the game looks close. If Black pulls back at 'd' instead of playing 9, he leaves himself open to the white placement at 'e'.

White 36. This move both attacks Black's center group and aims at the aji in the lower corner.

Figure 4 (137 – 186)





Figure 4 (137 – 186)

48: connects; 62, 65, 68: ko

Black 39. Black is able to strengthen his center group while at the same time making a large territorial move. If he plays 'a' to ensure the corner, he will have a hard time taking care of his stones when White strikes at the vital point of 82.

Black 53. Trying to kill White with 1 in Dia. 4 is unreasonable because of the cut at 6. If White and Black continued to push out immediately at 'a' and 'b', there would be no difficulty; however,



Dia. 4


White will first split Black in two at 8 and, because of the cutting aji at 6, he will probably not be able to save all his stones. In fact, the attack at 8 by itself would be enough to put Black in a tough spot. For Black, then, the ko is unavoidable, but since he has few ko threats and White has an unlimited number in the center, the game seems to be White's.

White 58. Kato confessed that this ko threat was reckless, for after the exchange to 61, the cut at 69 is severe. With the throw-in at 79 and the placement at 81, White loses his eyes. If White plays on the side, it has to be a descent at 59, although he could just as well start in the center at 82.

White 82. White must go after the black group


in the center. If he connects at 1 in Dia. 5, he loses when the semeai on the side becomes an unfavorable two-step ko.

Black 83. The semeai in the center is very difficult and Kato claimed that, if Black had played 83 at 'b', he expected to lose. That might not have been inevitable, however, as Ohira 9-dan



Dia. 5

came up with the sequence in Dia. 6 in which the peep at 4 is the key move. Kato stated, nevertheless, that the timing of the peep was critical and that he had no confidence that he would have been able to pick the proper moment, especially since he had thought he was about to lose. Winning, he decided, was just a matter of luck. As it was, the hane at 86 sealed Black's fate.



Dia. 6




Figure 5 (187 – 212)

99: at 97; 111: connects (above 97)

Figure 5 (187 – 212)

White 112. Black resigns. If he continues at 'a', White gets a profitable ko with 'b', although simply connecting above 112 for a seki would be adequate.

('Igo Club', Feb. 1981. Translated by David Thayer)

Game Three

Black: Kato Masao

White: Yamabe Toshiro

komi: 5½

played December 7, 1980, in Sapporo

Commentary by Kato Masao

Figure 1 (1 – 40)

White 6, 8. The same fuseki appeared in the 5th game of the Meijin title match (see GW 23) between Cho and Otake. I believe the originator of the pattern was the late Kitani. The idea is to stake the game on the komi.

Black 9. White 2 and 4 come to be well-placed as there are no obvious large points left after 9.

White 10. The usual move would be at 'a'. I can't say why Yamabe played here since I didn't ask him.

Black 15. Black doesn't play at 'b' because of the direction of the shimari in the upper right.

White 18. This kind of resistance with the attachment at 18 hasn't been seen much recently, although I remember a number of games in which Takagawa used it. It leads to a typical division of influence and profit, but it seems that Black should welcome the profit. I'm sure Yamabe,





Figure 1 (1 – 40)



Yamabe Toshiro


Born July 15, 1926, in Tokyo. Studied under Mukai 8-dan. Became shodan in 1941 and 9-dan in 1963. Has been challenger for various titles, including the 7th Oza and 20th Honinbo titles, but has never won one. Has been in the Meijin League, including the present one, a total of nine times.



Dia. 1

being Yamabe, knew this only too well and played this way out of spite. In fact, in this series I felt his imprint everywhere until it nearly made me ill. I had really expected 1 and 3 in Dia. 1. After 4 and 6, if White reinforced his two stones on the upper side, I planned to invade at 'a'. If he defended against the invasion with 7, I intended to stake the game on the attack with 8 and 10.

Black 35. This is the critical point for both sides to make a moyo. Taking it ought not to be bad, but I also agonized over Dia. 2. In exchange for letting White make a moyo with 4, the jump to 5 gives Black a stronger grip on the lower side. Despite White's moyo, Black is not inferior, so



Dia. 2

perhaps Dia. 2 is better.

White 36–Black 39 (previous page). White 36 is just what I had expected. Black 37 and 39 make it difficult for White to settle his stones easily. I was delighted to be on the attack.






Figure 2 (41 - 78)

Figure 2 (41 - 78)

Black 41–Black 45. The middle game fighting begins, but this attack is too simple-minded as Black becomes thin. Instead, I should have taken the slower approach of 1 and 3 in Dia. 3. White's forcing move at 48 (White can settle his group too easily if I let him get 49 too) and gain at 50 left me feeling rather displeased.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Black 51. This move is slack and should be at 1 in Dia. 4. If White jumps out to 2, Black settles the shape and returns to 7, thus keeping White under pressure. In the game Black builds thickness that comes to very little and has no good follow-up attack once White escapes with 54, 62 and 64. Moreover, there was the aji of White 'a' to worry about. After White 1 in Dia. 5, if Black tries to switch 2 to 'a', White answers at 'b'. Up to this point the pace seemed to be completely


Yamabe's, just as it was in the first two games.

Black 65. Moving out here is too heavy. I should have struck at the vital point of 'b' immediately, forcing 'c', and then attacked at 'd'. With the marked exchange in




Dia. 5

Dia. 6 in place, there is nothing to fear from White 1 as Black cuts White in two with 10 and 12. Without this exchange, however, White would be able to jump to the marked black stone with 11 and connect his stones.



Dia. 6


White 66–Black 71. White leans on Black with 66 and Black answers solidly, aiming at White's group on the right. White 70, however, is very slack and could probably be called the losing move. Correct here is the extension at 1 in Dia. 7 which emphasizes attacking the center. After settling the top, White has the smart attack at 7, a move pointed out by the referee Ishida and which, he said, would leave White with a promising game. I completely agree. After a move around 9, White effortlessly covers the thinness of his lower group and also develops an overwhelming attack. Black might consider the safer course of 2 at 'a', but the loss from a white sagari at 3 would be




Dia. 7

too much to bear. Yamabe later lamented that even though he knew letting Black play 71 would be bad, he still went ahead and played 70 anyway.

White 72. Retreating miserably in a place where it seems one should be fighting strongly is hardly like Yamabe, yet there seems to be little choice. White can resist with 1 and 3 in Dia. 8 and win the semeai, but Black will have shut him in tightly through 14, making it difficult for him to hold out against a black placement at 'a'. If he tries the emergency procedure of 1 and 3 in Dia. 9, Black replies in the usual way, then after invading with 10, escapes with 12. Not only is he again threatening 'a', he is also far ahead territorially.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Figure 3 (79 – 137)

Black 79–White 82. Although late, I still got to take the vital point of 79. Yamabe counterattacked from behind at 82 after forcing with 80, a move one does not like to make as it eliminates the aji in this area. The alternative is playing at 'a' which would lead to a more difficult, yet countable game, but apparently Yamabe was feeling too dismal after his failure at the top to get himself up for a drawn-out game. Black's replies to this counterattack are natural and ones that he is quite happy to make.

White 90–Black 93. White pushes the attack as hard as he can with 90, but 93 falls on just the right spot.

Black 101. When White fixes up his shape with 100, Black widens his lead with this invasion.





Figure 3 (79 – 137)

123: retakes

Black 107, White 108. As a result of White's developing his center stones, Black gets to attack at 107, putting White's group in grave danger. Nevertheless, Yamabe leaves it to fend for itself in order to try to cut down Black's lead with 108.

Black 109, White 110. Black takes the key point for eyes with 109. White can't block at 1 in Dia. 10 with 110 because a black play at 'a' affects his group on the side.



Dia. 10

Yamabe finally gives up at 137. This win gives Kato nine straight wins in Tengen title matches, but he is still a long way from equalling Sakata Eio's record of seventeen straight wins which he set in Honinbo title matches.

(*'Kido'*, February 1981. Translated by David Thayer.)

棋聖戦

5th Kisei Tournament

The 5th Kisei title match has resulted in yet another magnificent victory for Fujisawa Shuko. Otake Hideo seemed to be an opponent who would really test his mettle, yet Shuko defeated him by the lopsided score of 4 – 0, his best performance so far in the Kisei tournament. His cumulative score after five title matches is 20 – 6. Considering that his opponents – Hashimoto Uтарo (score 4 – 1), Kato Masao (4 – 3), Ishida Yoshio (4 – 1), Rin Kaiho (4 – 1) and Otake (4 – 0) – were the cream of the go world, this makes his dominance in the tournament all the more incredible. Moreover, he is the only member of his age group still winning titles. There are only two players of the tournament elite he has yet to meet in the Kisei tournament, that is, Takemiya Honinbo and Cho Chikun Meijin, but doubtless Shuko is confident that he could dispose of them as easily as the others. For nostalgic reasons, one would like to see a match between Shuko and Sakata Eio, for they were great rivals in the past, but at sixty-one, five years older than Shuko, Sakata's stamina might not be up to the strain of the two-day games of a title match. At any rate, with Shuko still at the peak of the go world, one can look forward to some more great title matches in the future.

Before giving the title match itself, we shall take a brief look at all three preliminary stages of this mammoth tournament.

Stage One

Listed below are the winners of the individual dan sections. Other players listed also gain a place in the second stage of the tournament.

1-dan: Shinkai Hiroko
2-dan: Ikezaki Tokinori
3-dan: O Mei-en
4-dan: Kobayashi Kenji
5-dan: Aragaki Takeshi

6-dan: Kanno Kiyonori
7-dan: Fukui Masaaki; 2nd: Nakamura Shidehito
8-dan: Cho Chikun; 2nd: Chino Tadahiko
9-dan: Sakata Eio; 2nd: Hashimoto Shoji;
3rd: Sekiyama Toshio, Kojima Takaho

9-dan Final

White: Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan

Black: Sakata Eio 9-dan

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

date: 10th July, 1980

Commentary by Sakata Eio

Figure 1 (1 – 58)

Black 17 before 19 is correct timing. If Black plays 19 first, giving White profit with 20, then plays 17, White might well ignore him, as his stone would now be light.

Black 21. Black 1 in Dia. 1 would be usual, but then the high corner enclosure of 2 would work nicely for White. If next Black 3, White 4 would make good shape. This result did not appeal to Sakata. The simple extension to 27 instead of 21 would be solid but insipid.

Black 23. Sakata felt tempted to press at 1 in Dia. 2. However, White would probably cut with 2 and 4, leading to a confused fight with Black's future prospects uncertain. Sakata therefore






Figure 1 (1 – 58)


decided to crawl with 23 etc. He could not make up his mind whether it would have been worth making the Black 30 – White 36 exchange first. White 30, sealing Black in by brute force, sur-




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

prised Sakata. His answer at 31 is the vital point, being nicknamed the 'ear' of this shape. Following Dia. 3 instead of 31 would be the worst approach, as White would get excellent thickness. Sakata also considered the invasion at 1 in Dia. 4, but that would be a little dangerous for Black after White 2 and 4. Since Black has taken some profit on the left and his right side position is still untouched, he can be satisfied with the light reducing move of 31.


Black 33. Sakata had his doubts about this move. He also considered playing a probe at 1 in Dia. 5. If White 2, Black could play 3, then beat a retreat with 5, getting a reasonable result. However, instead of 2 —

Dia. 6. White 2 here would be troublesome. Black naturally plays 3 and 5 and the sequence to 9 follows, but this would lead to another confused fight and there would be no saying how it might turn out. Sakata therefore played cautiously with 33, but White instantly peeped at 34.


Black 35. The key move in determining the flow of the game. Black is of course reluctant to connect docilely at 2 in Dia. 7, as 3 would be just right for White. This leisurely sequence is probably what White is hoping for. Black therefore starts a fight by attaching at 35.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8


The continuation from 36 to 44 is natural. In particular, 44 is the key point for attack and defence, so White must play there.

Black 47, 49. Sakata regretted this cut. The fact that it is bad style is borne out by the continuation. Black should simply have jumped to 'a' instead of 47; that would have created a more subtle position.

White 50 is a big move. If Black omits 51, White will force with 1 and 3 in Dia. 8. Black's group does not die, but his group at the bottom is cut off, so his overall position becomes thin. Black 51 is therefore forced.

Black 55 is an awful move which gives White a very useful forcing move at 56. White promptly makes another severe forcing move at 58 and suddenly Black starts to feel apprehensive. Instead of 55 —

Dia. 9. Black should exchange 1 for 2, then



Dia. 9

jump out at 3. He would just have to be philosophical about letting White connect underneath with 4. However, while this result would be an improvement on that in the game, it would still not be good for Black. That is his punishment for playing bad style with 47 and 49.




Figure 2 (58 - 100)

Figure 2 (58 - 100)

Black had underestimated the effectiveness of White's peep at 58. That is —

Dia. 10. Black thought that he could settle his group with the pressing move of 1, but that was an absurd misreading. White connects at 2, forces with 4 and 6, then presses at 8. This sequence works like a dream, killing Black by reducing him to one large eye. All of White's stones turn out to be in the right places, blocking Black's escape routes. Black perhaps overlooked this sequence because it was so simple.


White 60 seems to be a slack move. White was satisfied just with having played the forcing move at 58, but Sakata was worried that he might continue his attack with 1 in *Dia. 11*.

Dia. 11. If White attacked with 1, Black would be able to escape with 2 to 12, but in the process White would build thickness. This result seems better for White than that in the game.


Black 61, 63. These moves are an attempt to gain efficiency, but they are bad moves.

Black reinforces with 69, then attacks with 71 and 73, but he is still not confident about his position.


Black 75. The fighting in this corner is complicated and it is hard to determine what is best.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

At any rate, White was probably relieved to settle his group up to 90.

Black 91 and White 92 are miai.

White 96. Following *Dia. 12* might be better. White could aim at playing 'a' later.

White 100. The game still seems promising for White.

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Black 5. Intended as a light forcing move, but White counterattacks, leading to an unexpected variation.

White 8. If White just connects at 11, Black






Figure 3 (101 - 150)



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

intends to switch elsewhere.

White 20. White had to make a difficult decision here. Instead of 20 –

Dia. 13. White could also cut with 1 and 3. After White 7, Black 8 is natural, but then White can seal Black in with 9. If Black 10 and 12, White 13 is a good move. If Black 14, White wins the capturing race after 17. However, there are a lot of variations and Hashimoto was already short of time. Since he could not be sure of reading them all out, he elected for safety first with 20 and 22 in the figure, but Black upset his lead when he captured White's centre stones with 23.

White 46 threatens White 'a' next, so Black has to play 47.

Figure 4 (151 – 215)

White 56, played to prevent Black from making the sente hane at 'a', is the losing move: White should defend against Black's warikomi at 63. White may have felt that permitting Black to play 63 was the price he had to pay for taking points with 56, but capturing one stone in gote with 64 to 74 is too small. Instead of 64 –

Dia. 14. White might still have had a chance if he had played 1 here, though it would have been risky. The game would then have been decided by the fate of the centre white stones. Note that Black 'a', threatening Black 'b', would be sente.

With 75 and 77, Black gets a surprising amount of territory in the centre and this gives him a secure lead.

White 106 and 108 look like a final challenge, but White is just looking for a place to resign.

White resigns after Black 215.




Figure 4 (151 – 215)

8-dan Final

White: Cho Chikun (then Gosei)

Black: Chino Tadahiko

date: 15th May, 1980

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 39. Otake: This is an excellent point, but Black should first exchange Black 40 for White 'a'. White 40 is severe.

Black 45. Black undoubtedly expected White 'b' – Black 46 next. White 46 is an interesting counterattack. Perhaps Black should have played 45 before 39, as at that stage White would have answered at 'b'.

Permitting White 48 is painful for Black.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Black 65 prevents White from capturing all six stones with 'a', but even after 65, White can still pick up the tail-end three stones because of Black's shortage of liberties. If Black is going to play here, he might as well play at 'a', slow though it is. Actually, switching to Black 'b' looks more attractive. White's development picks up speed with 66 and 68.

Black 83. An attempt to avoid a ko and kill White outright.

Figure 3 (101 - 166)

White 2 was stubborn. Chino felt that extending at 3 instead of 2 would have been good enough




Figure 3 (101 - 166)



Chino Tadahiko

Born 4th July, 1937. Became a disciple of Nakamura Yutaro 9-dan in 1950, made shodan in 1953, reached 8-dan in 1974. Came 8th in the 7th Pro Best Ten in 1969, played in the 26th (1970) and 31st (1975) Honinbo leagues and won the 8-dan section in the 3rd Kisei tournament (1978).

for White.

Cho entered byo-yomi while thinking about 4, but he rarely makes mistakes under time pressure. Sure enough, he had life for his group all worked out.


Black 5. If at 6, White 'a'; if then Black 'b', White 'c'.

Black 9. If at 12, White plays 9 and Black cannot cut.

Black 19. If at 1 in Dia. 1, White lives with 2 to 6.

Black 21. Preparing to attack the centre group, capturing which is Black's last chance. However, the fact that Cho played 16 at the bottom showed that he was confident he could survive the onslaught.

The attempt to catch the large group proves unreasonable - White has too much room to



Dia. 1

manoeuvre — so Black throws in the towel after White 66. If he continued, he would probably have to take gote to defend the eye-shape of his group at the bottom, so White would be able to extend at 'd' in the centre. If Black attempted to take sente with 'e', forcing White 'f', there would still be the threat of White 'g'.

Because the opening was a little unfavourable for him, Chino took a gamble with 83 in Figure 2, but he was putting all his eggs in one basket. When White lived inside his moyo, he had to do something dramatic to get back into the game, but as the proverb has it, 'big groups don't die'.

Black resigns after White 166.

Stage Two

In the second stage, the seven players from the 7-dan winner up are seeded in the quarter-finals, while the others play a kind of knock-out series. The results were as follows:

Shinkai 1-dan lost to Ikezaki 2-dan, who beat O Mei-en 3-dan, but then lost to Kobayashi 4-dan. Kobayashi then beat Aragaki 5-dan, but lost to Kanno 6-dan, who in turn lost to Nakamura 7-dan, the latter taking the final quarter-final place.

Quarter-finals. Sakata beat Chino, Sekiyama b. Fukui, Cho b. Kojima, Hashimoto Shoji b. Nakamura

Semifinals. Sakata b. Sekiyama, Cho b. Hashimoto

Final. Cho b. Sakata

Final

White: Sakata Eio 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun 8-dan

date: 3rd September, 1980

Figure 1 (1–50)

White 32. The move in this game which Sakata regretted most. Black's ponnuki at 33 instantly gives him the advantage. Kato commented that Sakata should have followed Dia. 1. The sequence to 5 gives White thickness. White 32 was greedy.

White 44. White wants to fix up his shape by starting a ko, but he does not have an abundance of ko threats. White 'a' would be more leisurely.

Figure 2 (51–90)

White's lack of good ko threats handicaps him in the fight: he is unable to cut at 'a'.

White 76. If at 'b', Black would play 76 and would have superior thickness.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)






Figure 2 (51 – 90)

ko: 61, 64, 67, 70, 77, 80, 85

White 86–90. White does not get sufficient compensation for losing the ko. His group at the bottom left now has no base, while the three black stones at the bottom right still have plenty of aji. For example, see Dia. 2.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black can scoop out White's side territory with the sequence to 7. If White 2 at 4, Black gets a ko with 2. Even after White 8, Black still has a ko with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.





Figure 3 (91 - 121)



Dia. 3


Figure 3 (91 - 121)

White 94 leaves the possibility of a ko, starting with White 115, for later, but for the time being White must flee with 98.

Black 99 continues the attack, but according to Kato, Cho could have consolidated his lead by playing peacefully with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 3*.

Black 103 to 107 give up the endgame sequence shown in *Dia. 2*. This indicates that Black has decided to attack White's group in earnest.

Black 115 defends against the above-mentioned ko, but at a price. Without 116, Black could live in the corner with Black 'a', followed by Black 'b'. Black has to catch the white group to compensate, but at this stage that looks unlikely.



Dia. 4
5: ko; 9: connects




Figure 4 (122 - 160)

ko: 29, 32; ko (at 34): 43, 46, 49, 52;
54: connects (right of 22); 57: ko (above 34)

Figure 4 (122 - 160)

White 26. White's first slip: he could have lived with 1 in *Dia. 4*.

Dia. 4. Black cannot fight the ko, so he has to connect at 6. White could then live with 7 and 9. However, this sequence gives Black territory on the side, something which Sakata was hoping to avoid when he played 26 in the figure.

White 30 is the losing move. If instead White played at 31, then after the sequence Black 30, White takes the ko, Black 'a', White 37, White would be alive and would have a good chance of winning.




Figure 5 (161 – 203)
ko (at 66): 69, 72, 75; 77: *ko* (right of 64); 79: connects (at 64)

Figure 5 (161 – 203)

After the death of his large group, Sakata just played on to set the scene for resignation.

White resigns after Black 203.

Stage Three Tournament to Decide the Top Player

The following players participated in the third stage:

Seeded players

Otake Hideo: 5th Meijin

Takemiya Masaki: Honinbo

Kato Masao: Tengen

Cho Chikun: 1st in 2nd stage

Rin Kaiho: last year's challenger

Recommended players

Sakata Eio: 2nd in the 2nd stage

Sekiyama Toshio: 3rd in 2nd stage

Hashimoto Shoji: 3rd in 2nd stage

The results

Quarter-finals: Sakata beat Takemiya, Cho b. Sekiyama, Rin b. Kato, Otake b. Hashimoto

Semifinals: Cho b. Sakata, Otake b. Rin

Final: Otake b. Cho 2 – 1

Quarter-final: Otake v. Hashimoto

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Hashimoto Shoji

date: 16th October, 1980

Commentary by Otake Hideo




Figure 1 (1 – 36)

Figure 1 (1 – 36)

The game started with a large-scale joseki which is undergoing a lot of experimentation recently.

Black 21. The peep at 24 was played in the first game of last year's Kisei title match. For a discussion of the joseki, see GW18, p.26.

White 30. Cutting at 31 is also possible.

Figure 2 (37 – 69)

White 50. White would like to cut at 53, but then Black 50 would be severe.

White 54 is dubious: White should move out with a shoulder hit at 'a'. Black takes the lead when he seals White in with 55 to 59, then attacks White's base with 61.




Figure 2 (37 – 69)
 66: connects




Figure 3 (70 - 100)

Figure 3 (70 - 100)

White 70. White 'a' would also be a good point, but 70 makes it hard for Black to play 'b'.

White 78. Go Seigen felt that Otake was going too much for profit. Instead, he advocated building a moyo with the sequence White 89-Black 85-White 'c'. Otake later agreed with his opinion.

Black 87 etc. Black is aiming at the warikomi at 'd', which is why he does not connect at 'e' after White 90.

White 96 is a turning point. White could also attach at 97 and stake the game on whether or not he can live there. Otake played patiently with 96 and 98, because he felt the game was close.

Figure 4 (101 - 150)

Black 1, 3. An emergency measure to take sente.

When White invades at 12, the sequence to 17 is forced, but 18 is an overplay. Otake commented that he should just have played 1 etc. in Dia. 1, aiming at a semedori (that is, forcing Black to invest extra moves to take the white group off the board). The result in Dia. 1 would have given a close game.

Black 29 is a mistake; Black should crawl at 1 in Dia. 2.

Dia. 2. If Black 1, Black is able to cut at 5, which represents a gain of nine points over the sequence in the figure. White 2 at 'a' is refuted by Black 'b', White 'c', Black 5, White 'd', Black 4.

White 38 forestalls Black 'a', White 'b', Black 38.

Black 39 is Black's final challenge.





Figure 4 (101 - 150)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2




Figure 5 (151 - 200)

96: connects above 64

Figure 5 (151 - 200)

Black succeeds in living at the top, but he pays

a heavy price in doing so. White is able to hang on to his lead.





Figure 6 (201 - 266)



Dia. 3

Figure 6 (201 - 266)

White 16 is a mistake, letting Black pull out his stone. White should have played at 1 in Dia. 3. If Black 2, White kills him with 3 to 7; if Black 2 at 'a', White counters with 6. Perhaps Otake overlooked the hane at 19 in the figure. Since White retains sente to switch to 24, this is not a serious setback, however.

This game was decided in Figure 4. Otake made an overplay with 18, but ironically that led Hashimoto to make a mistake with 29.

White wins by 9½ points.

Semifinal : Cho v. Sakata

White: Sakata Eio 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun, Meijin

date: 13th November, 1980

This game was played the week after Cho won the Meijin title from Otake, so Cho would still have been under siege from newspaper and magazine reporters. If he was feeling the strain, it did not show in this game. At one stage Cho seemed to be jinxed by Sakata, losing eleven games in a





Figure 1 (1 - 50)

row to him, but he staged a reversal last year, beating Sakata in all three games they played in 1980. He also beat him in this year's Honinbo league, so now he has four in a row.

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White 8, 10. This exchange is usually made when Black has played the two-space pincer, as in Dia. 1, in which case White has the aji of 'a' for later. In this game Black gets good, solid shape up to 13, so the result is favourable for him. White has to try to get compensation by attacking on the left with 14 etc.





Dia. 1

White 32 is a new twist. The usual joseki is White 'a', Black 35, White 'b'. White 32 enables White to advance one space further with 36.

White 44 is dubious and makes the game difficult for White. Go Seigen suggested Dia. 2.

Dia. 2. (next page) Black has to answer at the top up to 6, so White can cut at 7. After White 11, Black has no good way of looking after his four stones on the left side. White 18 in the figure would now be in a very good position.

In the result to 49, Black does well on both sides: he encloses the top area and he takes



Black is left with a large move at 'a' to reduce the corner. This would give Black an easy win.

White 68. White would like to cut at 1 in Dia. 5, but unfortunately that would give Black the squeeze up to 10.

White 72. If at 1 in Dia. 6, Black lives in the corner with 2 to 8.

White catches up a little in the sequence to 72, but Black keeps in the lead, especially when he reinforces at 75 at the bottom. White had been hoping for a chance to attack this group with 'a', but it never came.

White 76. If at 1 in Dia. 7, Black has no trouble living with 2 to 12. He then has a severe attacking move at 14.





Figure 2 (51 - 100)

territory on the left side.

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

White 52 is an interesting move. White has to stop Black from linking up with the bottom group. The usual idea would be to jump to 1 in Dia. 3, but that does not work well here.

Dia. 3. If White 1, Black will force with 2 and 4, then play 6 to 10. If next White 'a', Black cuts him off with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

Alternatively, if White played 52 at 53, Black 57 would be just right for Black.

Black 57 is the vital point. Black settles his side group with ten points plus of territory, thus consolidating his lead.

Black 59. Simpler and better would be blocking on top with 1 in Dia. 4. After the sequence to 6,

Dia. 7


White 90 is the losing move, according to Go Seigen, as the yose sequence to 96 is not sufficient for White. Instead of 90, White should live in the corner with 1 to 9 in Dia. 8.

White 92. Living in the corner as in Dia. 9 would still be better, although White's territory to the left would be reduced.

Figure 3 (101 - 170)

Black 3. Black's privilege after playing 73 in Figure 2.

White 28. If omitted, Black will capture on a large scale by attaching at 'a'.



Dia. 8

Dia. 9




Figure 3 (101 – 170)




Figure 4 (171 – 236)

118: takes 111; 131: two spaces below 111;
135: connects at 78; 136: connects at 111

Black 43, 45. A good combination which secures centre territory. White is unable to resist 43.
Figure 4 (171 – 236)

Sakata played it out to the bitter end, but he was unable to make a dent in Cho's lead. Accord-

ing to Go Seigen, this game was decided by Sakata's slack move at 44 in Figure 1. Once Black defended at 57 in Figure 2, the game was his.

Black wins by 6½ points.

3rd Stage Playoff, Game One

The playoff to decide the challenger is a mini title match in itself. Each player receives a match fee of ¥2,200,000, almost as much as a minor title, and more importantly, the winner gets a chance at the real money. Just becoming the Kisei challenger is worth enough in match fees etc. to live on for a year, even if one does not win the title (the full Kisei prizemoney is listed in GW19). The 1980 playoff saw the third clash for the year between Otake and Cho Chikun, the two players who dominated the headlines in the go world last year. What with the Gosei and Meijin title matches and this playoff, the two in effect played a best-of-fifteen match last year. The honours were perhaps split: Cho led with six wins to five, but Otake won the Gosei match and this playoff.

White: Cho Chikun, Meijin

Black: Otake Hideo, Judan & Gosei

date: 27th November, 1980

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko, Kisei

Figure 1 (1 – 25). *An unfavourable joseki*

The sequence from 11 to 25 is a joseki, but it is not considered to be a very good one for Black. He may have the threat of 'a', but at present White can squash it with the sequence in






Figure 1 (1 – 25)



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


Dia. 1. White might even be able to play 2 at 4; if Black 2, White presses at A.

On the other hand, White can later play 1 and 3 in Dia. 2. Ignoring White 3 would invite a considerable loss for Black, but if Black A, White takes the ko, forcing Black B, so White reduces the corner anyway.


However, Otake must have taken all this into account when he chose this joseki and decided that despite the local drawbacks, playing this way was a feasible strategy.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4 14: ko



Dia. 5 11: connects

the moment that Shuko saw this move, he commented that it was probably an overplay and that it might even become the losing move. Instead of 46, playing at 'b' or 'c' would give a leisurely game. Another possibility –

Dia. 4. White could attack with 1. The continuation to 14 is probable, but White now has a problem, for he does not have enough ko threats.

White 52. Cho Chikun regretted this move. Instead, White should play at 'd'. When Black jumps to 53, White cannot omit 54, since Black 54 would make superb shape, but that gives Black the chance to fix up his shape with 55 to 61.

White 56. White has to resist the temptation to hane at 1 in Dia. 5. He would collapse in the continuation to 15.

Black has upset White's lead in the sequence to 61. White has lost ground in the attack he started with 46: Black has not only secured his weak group but has also jumped into White's corner with 49. White attempts to recover by invading at 62.




Figure 2 (26 – 62)

Figure 2 (26 – 62). Black recovers.

Black 27. Black does not want to move out with 1 etc. in Dia. 3 because of White's thickness with the three stones further up the left side. Shuko considers the sequence to 40 as correct for both.

Black 41, which eliminates the aji of Dia. 2, is the kind of thick move Otake is fond of. Even so, Shuko commented that at this point he would prefer to have white. Takemiya Honinbo said that he would play 41 at 'a'.

White 46 is the vital point for eye-shape, but

Figure 3 (63 – 100). Missed opportunities

Black 63 met with disapproval. Shuko and Sakata concurred in laying out the sequence in Dia. 6, which would have maintained Black's lead. If White plays 6 at 10, then Black gets a good result with Black A, White 8, Black B.

Black 69. Countering with a hane at 1 in Dia. 7 does not work well, since Black cannot block







Figure 3 (63 - 100)




Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

at 7. If he does...

The sequence to 79 seems inevitable.

White 82. Shuko commented that this would have been the right time to descend at 1 in Dia. 8 as a probe. If Black 2, White links up with 3 and 5; if Black intercepts at 5 instead of 2, White could then switch to the corner, getting life with the sequence in the figure.

Because White lived in the corner first, with 82 etc., Black connected underneath with the sequence from 93, the final result being that White did not make any profit from his corner invasion. Moreover, Otake missed a chance to destroy White by playing 97 at 'a'.

Dia. 9. If Black 1, a semeai follows, but White only has seven liberties, while Black has a minimum of eight. This sequence was discovered by Abe 8-dan. Cho apparently woke up to it at some stage, but Otake claimed that he missed it altogether. The Yomiuri reporter refused to believe this, preferring to think that Otake decided to play safe because he was ahead.




Figure 4 (101 - 152)

36: left of 3; 37: left of 5; 49: connects Figure 4 (101 - 152). Otake plays solidly.

Even though he missed the knockout punch, Black can still be satisfied with the result to 5, in which he captures two stones. White may have lived in the corner, but Black got compensation for this when he descended at 91 in Figure 3, for that makes it difficult for White to get much territory with his centre bottom group.

Black 11. Black 26 would also be a good point.

White 12 to 16 create some potential for attacking the black group later. After 17, White could stop Black from getting a second eye with White 23, Black 'a', White 'b'.

White 30. Good fighting spirit on Cho's part, since he was already in byo-yomi. The throw-in at 36 is a good move which makes 38 sente. White seems to recover a little in the sequence to 52.






Figure 5 (153 - 200)



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Figure 5 (153 - 200). The final fight

White 56 can be seen as tempting Black into a fight or as deserting the battlefield. It might be the losing move. Perhaps White should have played at 'a'.

White 60. White 1 in Dia. 10 was suggested after the game.

Dia. 10. White sacrifices two stones, taking sente in order to attack with 7. He can get a ko up to 13, but Black could afford to give up the corner in exchange for two moves in a row at A




Figure 6 (201 - 287)

ko (at 77): 80, 83; 87: connects ko

and B. The conclusion is that White could not have staged an upset.

Black 65 is a tesuji. If White 1 and 3 in Dia. 11, Black sets up a semeai which he should be able to win.

White 78, 80. This tesuji secures the group on the left while also picking up four black stones. However, Black keeps sente to switch to the defence at 87 and he maintains his lead.

Figure 6 (201 - 287). First blood to Otake

Black 3 secures connection for the five black stones to the right, so the game is over. Black seems to have lost a little in the subsequent end-game, but since he had a comfortable lead, that did not matter.

Black wins by $4\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Game Two

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Cho Chikun

date: 11th December, 1980

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko

Figure 1 (1 - 50). A severe peep

Black 15 and 17 strain for maximum development from the Chinese-style pattern. Black continues all-out with 23 and 25, but Shuko felt that White's fuseki was superior.






Figure 1 (1 - 50)
45: connects



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

White 32. Shuko advocated pushing through with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1, leading to the sequence to 9; if next Black A, White hanes at B. If Black plays C instead of 4, White extends at 4, prepared to fight.

Black 37 is very severe. Even after White 38 to 44, it is still peeping at the vital point. The timing of 37 is important.

Dia. 2. If Black defends at 1 before peeping at 3, White will counter with 4 and 6 and should be



Dia. 3





Figure 2 (51 - 80)



Dia. 4

able to settle himself.

White 38. If White answers at 2 in Dia. 3, Black 3 is definitely sente. Black's attack with 5 is then dangerous.


Figure 2 (51 - 80). *Thickness for Black*

White links up with 54 and 56 and the fight started by his invasion comes to an end. More than twenty professionals, including Shuko, were following the game at the Nihon Ki-in and all but one thought that Otake had done well here. The lone dissenter was Fujisawa Hosai, who felt that Black's thickness gave him the edge. Hosai was correct. A couple of days later, Shuko amended his opinion: 'I was wrong too. White has lost three stones outright and Black has superior thickness.' After the game Otake confirmed that the result for White was unsatisfactory.

White 68 is solid. White could also have made the hane at 1 in Dia. 4. If Black attacks with 4, White plays 5 and 7 to settle his group.

White 76 deprives Black of a base, forcing him to move out with 77 etc. The fight started here eventually spreads all over the board.

Black 79. Black cannot hane at 1 in Dia. 5, as White counters with the sequence to 10.



Dia. 5





Figure 3 (81 - 112)



Dia. 6


Figure 3 (81 - 112). A splitting attack

White 86. There are various ways to answer Black 85, but White is limited in his choice, because he has to think of the centre. For example, White could take sente with 1 in Dia. 6, but the result to 10 looks unsatisfactory, because it gives Black too much central thickness. White 86 is safer: it does not help the opponent to strengthen himself, so White can aim at a counterattack later on.


Black 87. If at 88, White plays 'a', while if at 'a', White 'b' — either way Black cannot do anything.

White 92. White decides to settle the group on the right first. If White plays at 1 in Dia. 7 instead, Black is able to guard the top with 4 and 6. Black threatens to get a ko with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', so Black would have to defend this group (by capturing at 'd'), but then Black could launch a severe attack on the left with 'e'.

Black 95, 97. Black succeeds in splitting White into two. He looks like capturing one of the groups.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Black 103. If Black becomes impatient and blocks at 1 in Dia. 8, White will be happy to discard his group. Even though Black wins the semeai, he would have to take the white group off the board. In the meantime, White 4 lays waste to his territory at the top. Black prefers to use the cut at 103 in order to link up. He is confident that he can catch one of the white groups.

White 104, 108. White is hoping for Black 'c', so that he can cut in sente at 'd'. Black answers patiently with 109, but now the eye-shape of his corner group is insecure, so White moves into action with 110 and 112.

Figure 4 (113 - 169). White loses one group.

White 18 is a superb counter to Black's attempted forcing combination of 15 and 17. If Black answers at 1 in Dia. 9, he can cut with 3 and 5, but then White cuts at 6. When White escapes with 8 and 10, Black has no defence against the threat of White 'a'. Black therefore leaves the side group and returns to his attack in the centre with 23 and 25.

White 30. If at 31, Black will play 30 in sente, then extend at 'a', thus continuing his attack on the group on the left. White prefers to discard the group on the right. Since he captures four black stones and since there are weak points in Black's position, the game is still close.

Black 39. If at 40, White plays 44. However, the patient answer at 39 lets White pull out his




Figure 4 (113 - 169)





Figure 5 (170 - 217)



Dia. 9

Dia. 10

stones with 46 and 48. The fight after 49 is extremely difficult, but the sequence to 63 seems best for both.

Black 65 is necessary after White 64; if omitted, White 'b' would threaten the whole group.

White 66. This probe was left until too late. In retrospect, it seems that White should have played it around move 42, at which point Black might have answered at 'c'. In that case —

Dia. 10. With the $\triangle$ $\blacktriangle$ exchange made, White can play the sequence to 7 in sente. Black 2 is forced — if at 4, White plays 2 for a ko. This would have made the game very close.

Figure 5 (170 - 217). *Cho evens the series.*

White 70. This secures the capture of the corner group and is the balance of White's compen-

sation for giving up his group on the right, but when Black gets sente to start the endgame with 71, White cannot hope to win. When he resigns, White is only about $2\frac{1}{2}$ points behind, but there is no way for him to make up that difference.

White resigns after Black 217.

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Otake Hideo

date: 18th December, 1980

Commentary by Go Seigen

Figure 1 (1 - 26). *White's counter-pincer*

White 10. Go Seigen: 'If White plays first at 1 in Dia. 1 (next page), 2 to 4 follow, after which




Figure 1 (1 - 26)



Figure 3 (61 - 112)





Figure 2 (27-60)



Dia. 2


Dia. 3

White 58. The last large point (oba).

Figure 3 (61 – 112). Complications

White 62. This is the right time to make this peep. If played later, after 1 etc. in Dia. 3, Black would answer at 6.

Black 65. Otake: 'Having invaded at 61, I should perhaps have attached at 1 in Dia. 4. The continuation to 8 is one possibility. However, White might switch to 'a' with 4; if Black 'b', then White 'c' or 'd'. White takes away Black's base on the side, while Black lays waste to the top. I in-




Diag. 4

White 28. If White 30 instead, the continuation Black 'c', White 'd', Black 31 would be good for Black.

Black 29. If at 'a', White will play 'd'.

Black 47. If at 1 in Dia. 2, White has prepared the counter to 10.

White 54 is correct: blocking at 'e' would only create a cutting point. If instead White cut at



Dia. 6

tended to play 1 next if White answered 65 in the figure by connecting.'

White 78. If he attached at 'c', White would be able to catch the black stone in the centre, but the hanetsugi with 78 and 80 is bigger.

Black 83. This move upset Go Seigen, who felt that it made the game promising for White. In his opinion, Black should have played at 1 in Dia. 5.


Dia. 5. If Black 1 and 3, White cannot link up with the bottom group. White 4 is unreasonable, since Black would take sente with 5 to 11, then cut at 13. White would therefore have to play 4 at A, after which Black B, White 13, Black 6 would follow. Black could expect to play C later, reducing White's corner territory to seven points. In the game Black simply played 1 at 3, so White was able to connect underneath with White 1, Black D, White E, securing fifteen points of territory in the bottom left.

Black 93. Black could also cut at 1 in Dia. 6, but his centre group would be weakened after the sequence to 10.


White 94. Cho regretted this move. Although 94 takes territory, the exchange for 95 weakens the white group on the right side. For example, after White 104 —

Dia. 7. Black can attack the white group with the sequence shown here. The combination of 5 and 7 is particularly severe and enables Black to set up a ko up to 11. Instead of 94, White should have reinforced in the centre by connecting at 'd' in the figure.

White 100. The second move regretted by Cho. He played 100 to help his centre stones just in case Black cut at 'e', but Black later created a weakness in his position by pushing up at 'f', so extending solidly at 'f' with 100 would have been better. The first points raised by Cho in the post-game discussion were these two questionable



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

moves at 94 and 100.

White 106. Cho went into byo-yomi.

Black 107 is the kind of thick move that Otake likes, though he commented that perhaps he should have played at 109. White 108 is a clever move: White is worried about the threat of Black 21 and 23 in the next figure, but 108 increases the number of his liberties, which would help if it came to a semeai.






Figure 4 (113 - 152)





Figure 5 (153 - 201)

99: ko



Dia. 8

Figure 4 (113 - 152). *A slight lead to White*

Black 13. Otake: 'If Black were to lose, this would be the losing move. Helping White to secure definite eye-shape with 14 is dubious. Perhaps I should have gone through with the sequence in Dia. 7... The timing of Black 21 and 23 was also bad. Far from helping Black, they just give White a good move at 28. I should simply have played 25 and 27.'

White 32. Connecting at 1 in Dia. 8 is unreasonable because of Black 2 etc. Instead of playing 4 at 5, Black captures White with the ko to 8. White cannot win a ko.

Black 45 is worth about ten points. The game is very close.

White 48. Otake: 'I think that White 48 gives Black a loss by $1\frac{1}{2}$ points. My feeling was that White was scoring all the points in the yose.

I did consider making a do-or-die move with 45 at 51, but ...'

Figure 5 (153 - 201). *The game-deciding ko*

When White declines to connect at 57, Black has to cut there. As a result, the 'dead' white stones in the centre come back to life and in exchange Black gets a large territory at the bottom. Fighting spirit made this large-scale trade a natural one, but Otake commented that he did not profit by it. Go Seigen confirmed that White gained two points. To look at this exchange more closely —

Dia. 9. If White connects at 1 instead of 56 in the figure, Black plays 2 and 4, reducing White to a mere two points, since he has to fill in at 'a' and 'b' later. However, since the exchange following 56 favours White —

Dia. 10. Black should have forced with 1 and 3 instead of playing 55 in the figure. According to Go Seigen, that would have given an even game.


White 84. Otake: 'This is the losing move. If White had connected at 91, he would probably have won by $2\frac{1}{2}$ points.'

Black 91 is a sharp move. When White answers at 92, Black makes a throw-in at 93 and White cannot capture at 'a'.


Dia. 11. If White 1, Black sets up an oi-otoshi to 6 unless White can play 3 at 'a' and win the ko.

White 96. Go Seigen commented that White could have reduced the number of Black's ko threats by following Dia. 12.


White 100. White has to connect — he cannot




Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11 3: connects



Dia. 12

risk the fight in Dia. 11.

Figure 6 (202 – 247). *White falls behind.*

White does not have enough ko threats, so he has to give up his four stones in the centre and finish off the ko with 46. Black thus gets eleven points of territory and this decides the game. If




Figure 6 (202 – 247)

ko: 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44




Figure 7 (248 – 277)

69: ko (right of 66); 75: connects (at 66); 76: connects (at 67)

White has to lose something, giving Black the three stones at the bottom might seem smaller, but if White ignored Black 39 in order to play 46, Black would take sente with Black 40, White 'a', and still win, though perhaps by a smaller margin. **Figure 7 (248 – 277).** *Otake becomes the challenger.*

Once Otake set up the ko in Figure 5, the game was his and he had his revenge for his defeat in the Meijin title.

Black wins by 3½ points.

5th Kisei Title Match

The pairing for the 5th Kisei title match seemed to be ideal, matching as it did the two leading representatives of the 'art-for-art's-sake' school in contemporary go. Shuko and Otake are both known as artists of the go board and they have similar styles, favouring thickness and striving for originality in the fuseki.

At the start of the Third Stage, Otake commented that it had long been his ambition to play a serious match with Shuko. Previously, he had only met him in two minor title matches, both of which he had won (these were the 1st and 4th All Japan Top Place tournaments in 1970 and 1974, which he won 2-1 and 2-0 respectively). In their overall career record, Otake also had a lead, having won fifteen of the twenty-seven games the two had played prior to this title match, but Shuko is a completely different proposition in the Kisei tournament. It has become a cliché that he stakes his survival as a professional player upon this one tournament and with reason, for his results in the other tournaments are abysmal. How much of a loss this is for the go world is demonstrated by the games given below: in form, Shuko is the most creative go player around.

Game One

White: Fujisawa Shuko, Kisei

Black: Otake Hideo, Judan & Gosei

komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each

date: 13th, 14th January, 1981

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko

Figure 1 (1 - 45). *Shuko-style*

White 12. A bold and original move: it limits Black's moyo while aiming at the invasion at 'a'. White 12 is more forceful than the conventional move of 1 in Dia. 1.

Dia. 1. If White 1, the severity of an invasion at 'a' is lessened, so Black would ignore White, switching to 2. Black could also play 2 at 'b'; White 'c' and Black 'd' would probably follow.







Figure 1 (1 - 45)
ko: 27, 32



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3


Black 13 seems a little passive, but Black has no good counter to 12.

Dia. 2. If Black 1, White plays 2 and the continuation to 20 is likely. This would be painful for Black. If Black 11 at 12, White gouges out the bottom area with 11.


Dia. 3. Black 1 is a possibility. The players gave the continuation to 12.




Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Black 19. Otake commented that he should simply have extended at 1 in Dia. 4, though Shuko said that he would have been satisfied with the continuation to 12.

White 26. Connecting at 1 in Dia. 5 is considered joseki, but here Black would get nice shape with 2 to 6, so White would not be happy.

Black 27. Shuko: 'This move surprised me. I think it must have been a slip. Black would have

had quite a good game if he had connected at 34 instead.' That would give Dia. 6.

Black 31. Playing at 34 now would not give the same result as in Dia. 6.


Dia. 7. Black 1 to White 4 create the same shape as in Dia. 6, but the difference is that the exchange of Black ▲ for White 2 is a minus for Black in the corner.

The exchange in the bottom right comes to a conclusion with Black 35. White has linked up his groups on the right side and has taken about twenty points of territory. The comparison with Dia. 6 makes it clear how badly Black has done here. The general feeling was that he had suffered a loss equivalent to the komi. Some professionals commented that the game was already decided.


Black 37 is correct. Instead —

Dia. 8. If Black 1, White hanes at 2. Black can separate White with 5, but White gets a ponnuki with 6 and 8, obliterating Black's moyo. Instead of 3 —


Dia. 9. Playing 3 and 5 would only give White the aji of the sequence White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd'—White 'e' with which to squeeze Black.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Black 41 is the only move — if at 'b', White would make a pincer, which would combine well with his thick position at the bottom.

White 44. Shuko rejected the idea of playing at 45, laying out the sequence in Dia. 10 after the game. Shuko: 'This result gives Black weak groups at the top left and on the left side, but if Black

took a defiant attitude, daring White to attack him, it would be very difficult for White to work out an effective double attack. In contrast, White 44 in the figure secures safe territory in the top left corner.'

Black 45 is essential once White plays 44. If omitted, White would make an all-out extension to 'c'.




Figure 2 (46 - 90)

Figure 2 (46 - 90). White plays solidly.

White 52, 54. A very severe attacking combination. Takagawa Shukaku suggested making a pre-emptive attack with 47 at 1 in Dia. 11.


Dia. 11. If White 2, Black 3 is a good continuation. If White 'a' after 5, then Black could split White into two with 'b'; if instead White 'c', then Black could block at 'd', which would make Black much thicker than in the figure. After the game, Shuko expressed his admiration for this suggestion.

White 52. White 1 in Dia. 12 would be slack. Black would play 2 to 6, leaving him with 'a' for later. Black 'a' would in turn set up a large move at 'b'. Instead of 5 -


Dia. 13. If White 5 here, Black would force with 6 to 10 and still have 'a' for later. White would not be happy.

Black 55. Pushing through immediately at 61 is not very good.


Dia. 14. If Black 1, White will capture a stone with 2 to 8. Black would then have the threat of the peep at 'a' or the direct cut adjacent, but White would have a peep at 'b'. Instead of 1 -




Dia. 11




Dia. 12




Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15




Dia. 16

Dia. 15. If Black blocks at 1, White would go for territory with 2 and 4.


Neither of the above diagrams is very appealing for Black, so he resorts to a diversionary attack with 55. However, this tactic does not work very well.

White 60, the sealed move on the first day, continues the attack. If at 1 in Dia. 16, Black would play 2 and 4 and could then aim at wedging in at 'a'.


Black 61. If at 1 in Dia. 17, the continuation to 12 could be expected. With White solidifying his positions above and below, Black would have reason to be dissatisfied.




Dia. 17




Dia. 18




Dia. 19



Dia. 20



Dia. 21



Dia. 22

Black 65 indicates that Black has decided to sacrifice his three stones (55 – 59).

Black 67. If Black cuts at 1 in Dia. 18, White pulls back at 2, then lives in the corner with 4 and 6. Instead of 5 –

Dia. 19. Black could turn it into a semeai (capturing race) by jumping into the corner at 5, after first forcing with 1 and 3, but he loses the fight.

Dia. 20. The hane at 1 is not very good either. Black's stones would just get heavier and heavier, giving White an ideal opportunity to engineer a double attack on this group and the group below.

White 68 is as solid as a rock: White is not worried about the cut below 67. Cho Chikun commented that since Black is behind anyway, he would have gone through with the cut. He

gave the sequence in Dia. 21.


Dia. 21. Black 1 to 5 are natural. Next –

Dia. 22. If White 6, a difficult fight would follow when Black attaches at 7. However, Shuko commented that he would just have played 6 at 14. In his opinion, Black would have to invest so many stones to capture the three white stones in the centre that it would not be worth the trouble. Since Otake changed course after 67, switching to defence with 69, he presumably agreed with Shuko.


When Black plays 69, defending against the cut with 70 becomes more important, especially as 70 also threatens the black group. The continuation to 76 is natural.

Black 77, played to help Black's eye-shape, is well-timed: Black has to take sente here so that he can switch to right side.

White 78. The docile answer is best. If White made the hane at 1 in Dia. 23, complications would ensue. Since he is ahead, it is to White's advantage to keep the game simple.




Dia. 23



Dia. 24

Black 79 and 81 defend against the threat of Dia. 24. Black has almost no ko threats, so he could not fight a ko with Black 'a'—White 'b'.

White 82 is a superb move which helps White to wind up the game. This move limits the potential of Black's moyo at the top right while also aiming at an invasion. In addition, it expands White's top left moyo and incidentally casts a distant but menacing glance at Black's group on the centre left. This stone kills rather more than two birds. Fellow professionals were full of admiration for 82, some going so far as to call it the most impressive move of the game.



Dia. 25

Black 89 permits White 90, which decides the game, so Black should have played at 94 or 95. That would have left him with some hope.

White 90 is a pungent move: Black is unable to resist. If he blocks at 1 in Dia. 25, White counters with 2 to 6. White would ignore a ladder-block at 'a': his right side position is so solid that he would cheerfully discard the two stones above 'a'.





Figure 3 (91 - 115)



Dia. 26

19: connects

Figure 3 (91 - 115). The game is decided.

Taking profit in sente up to 102 is a great success for White, but Black is unable to connect at 100 with 99.

Dia. 26. If Black 1, a semeai follows, but it develops most unfavourably for Black.






Figure 4 (116 - 166)



Dia. 27



Dia. 28

White 104 starts the endgame. Playing this move is equivalent to a declaration of victory by White.

Figure 4 (116 - 166). First blood to Shuko

White 26 aims next at jumping in at 63, so Black defends at 27. One might be tempted to make a hane at 28 instead of 27, but Black would not profit by it.

Dia. 27. If Black 1 and 3, Black can invade the side with 5, forcing White to scrape out life with 6 to 12. However, Black ends in gote, so his gain is not as big as it looks, even though Black 'a' would also be sente. If one is going to make the hane at 1 —

Dia. 28. The sequence here, which keeps sente, is correct.

Otake resigned after White 66: this stone cannot be captured. If Black intercepts at 'a', White counters with 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'. Apparently, the game is dead even on the board, which means that White has a win by 5½ points.

This game was a superb win for White and it is considered Shuko's masterpiece of the series.

Black resigns after White 166.

(*'Kido'*, March 1981)

Game Two

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Fujisawa Shuko

date: 28th, 29th January, 1981

played at the Grand Hotel in Sapporo

Commentary by Takemiya Honinbo




Figure 1 (1 - 35)

Figure 1 (1 - 35). *Black is satisfied.*

Black 5, 7. The formation at the bottom has been dubbed the mini-Chinese fuseki and is regarded as a positive way to play.


White 14. This move protects against the black push at 'a' and cannot be omitted.

Black 15. Black could also consider extending to 'b' on the left side.

Black 21. An alternative development, which appealed to Takemiya, is Black 'c', White 22, Black 'd'. Black 'c' aims at 'e'.

White 28. White probably regarded this reduction as sufficient, but it caused the game to become an uphill struggle for him. Invading with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1 would seem to have been better, as there is plenty of room here. He could then establish a comfortable position by jumping out with the knight's move at 7.

Black 35. Black expresses confidence in his fuseki when he takes this point. Not only does he



Dia. 1




Figure 2 (36 - 59)


strengthen his group, he also has the invasions at 'b', 'f' and 'g' to aim at.

Figure 2 (36 - 59). *A questionable invasion*


Black 39 - 45. After White protects the corner with 36 and 38, the invasion at 39 and attachment at 41 are natural. Instead of 42, if White hanes at 43, Black will easily settle his stones with the counter-hane at 'a'. Black makes shape up to 45, thereby lessening the chances of a severe double attack against this group and the one to the left.

White 48. The normal procedure would be to exchange 'b' for 'c', then split Black at 'd'. That is not good enough for White, which indicates that his original fuseki was bad. Also, White 48 seems to be the wrong invasion point. If at 1 in Dia. 2, White has the tesuji White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c' at his disposal after defending at 5. In the game, 49 and 51 work very nicely for Black.

White 52. If White hanes on the top in Dia. 3 Black will hem him in through 12.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3





Figure 3 (60 - 94)


Figure 3 (60 - 94). *A zigzagging battlefront*

White 60. If White connects at 1 in Dia. 4, he loses the semeai.

White 62-Black 69. A large-scale trade seems to be in the offing after White 62 and Black 63. However, if Black initiates it by answering White 64 at 1 in Dia. 5, White can force at 6. Accordingly, Black backs off and lets White escape at 66, then escapes himself with 69.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

White 74, 78. Black connects at 'b' if White cuts at 'a' with either of these moves.

Black 79. This move is severe and makes White's disadvantage clear.

White 80. White finds a small crack in Black's corner and uses it to capture a stone on the outside. White could probably live by making a hane underneath at 87 with 84. However, Black would





Figure 4 (95 - 129)

become so strong that pushing in at 'c' would probably be enough to put the game out of reach.

Figure 4 (95 - 129). *Black's lead vanishes*

Black 95, 97. Capturing here may seem thick, but it is actually slack and could easily have become the losing move. Black could have maintained his momentum by simply pushing through at 99 or, according to Kato Tengen, by defending against the cut at 100. When White cuts at 100 in the game, Black's lead suddenly disappears.

Black 101. Trying to capture White's group in the lower left, as in Dia. 6, would be a serious error. After 10, White answers Black 'a' at 'b' and Black loses his stones in a snapback. Black has no choice but to live with 101 and then reduce White's center with 103.




Dia. 6

White 104. Since Black would probably take 104 if White halted Black's intrusion at 105, he shows a tough attitude by taking it for himself.

Black 105. Black cannot come in any further. For example, if he played 105 at 107, this stone

would be cut off after White 105, Black 'a', White 'b'. When White closes off the center, the game looks close.

Black 115, White 116. If Black settled for the ordinary clamp at 'c', he would lose. Consequently, he takes advantage of White's thinness at the top and makes a strong move at 115. In the same way, if White simply blocked at 'd', his chances would also be doubtful. He therefore firmly resists at 116, making a tense fight inevitable.



Dia. 7

Black 117. Black should first hane at 119, then connect solidly at 'd'. If the same moves to 128 followed, Black could omit 129 because he could connect underneath at 'c' in safety. In the game, if Black tried to cross under after 128, White would connect at 4 in Dia. 7 and then take the large point at 6. This is possible because White 'd' is sente, threatening a ko after the throw-in combination of White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', so White's stones are assured of a connection. Had the marked black stone been at 'c', White would have had to connect out in gote, thus making a difference of one move.





Figure 5 (130 - 189)


Figure 5 (130 - 189). Seesaw yose

White 30. It is more profitable for White to give up four stones and make forcing moves at 34 and 38. If he saved them by connecting underneath, he would lose when Black took 54.

White 32. The exchange for 33 loses points. If possible, White would like to start with the wari-komi at 1 in Dia. 8, but there is a strong possibility that Black would answer White 3 by connecting at 4, so White has to play 3 first.



Dia. 8




Dia. 9

Black 35. Playing at 2 in Dia. 9 would be greedy. After forcing at 3, White cuts with 7 and 9 and Black loses the semeai.

White 42. According to Takagawa 9-dan, who worked out the yose for a newspaper commentary, White wins by half a point if he captures three stones with White 55.

White 44. It would be too small to make the diagonal connection at 'a' unless White could aim at a ko.

Black 59. If Black plays elsewhere, White has the clever combination of 1 and 3 in Dia. 10, a yose play with a value of eight points in sente.



Dia. 10

Black 69. Black protects against the clamp at 71, but as a result of the White 70-Black 71 exchange, White is able to penetrate from the center and eventually force Black to add a move at 79. Additionally, White can later force Black to remove the captured white stones by cutting at 'b'. Playing 69 at 70 would have been more solid

if Black is not going to defend the center.

White 80. This move is small since a black hane at the same point comes to nothing: after White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', Black is trapped in a snapback no matter how he plays.





Figure 6 (190 - 229)
120: connects above 104

Figure 6 (190 - 229). The final missed opportunity


Black 95. This had to be at 1 in Dia. 11. If White answers at 2, Black hanes at 3 and gains a large profit up to 9. If instead of 2 White connected at 9, Black 2 and White 4 would probably follow, but even so that would be better for Black than simply pushing at 2 with 1.



Dia. 11


Pushing through and cutting with 95 in the figure may not seem bad, since White is prevented from playing atari at 1 in Dia. 12, but the Black 95-White 96 exchange allows White to make a ponnuki at 100, a result quite different from Dia. 11.

White 102. This atari, made about the time Otake entered byo-yomi, is the losing move.



Dia. 12

Even though White takes two stones, he must back off to 106 after Black stops his advance at 105. According to the yose worked out by the professionals following the game, White would have won by half a point if he had squeezed Black with 1 to 5 in Dia. 13.



Dia. 13

6, 31: connects

Otake, $2\frac{1}{2}$ or $3\frac{1}{2}$ points behind, resigned at 229. Takagawa commented that it was unusual for a title match game to produce so many ups and downs in the yose. The game was also unusual for the sight of Otake, a fast but artistic player, making moves to gain time, for example, 112 and 118 in the last figure.

('Kido', March 1981. Translated by David Thayer.)



Game Three

White: Fujisawa Shuko

Black: Otake Hideo

date: 4th, 5th February, 1981

played at Beppu




Figure 1 (1 - 39)

Figure 1 (1 - 39). O-moyo strategy

White 10. Fujisawa: 'If White extends farther to 'a', Black will probably come in at 'b'.'

White 12. Fujisawa: 'This was a natural pincer.'

Otake: 'If White plays 12 at 'c', then after Black 'd', White 13, Black 30, when White extends to 'e', Black 37 becomes good.'

Black 17. Otake: 'I thought this was correct. I didn't like the joseki in which Black pushes at 1 in Dia. 1.'


Fujisawa: 'After Black 15 in Dia. 1, White will make the diagonal connection at 16.'

Otake: 'Then Black has to play 17, which leaves the triangled stone in an unsatisfactory position.'


Black 23. Fujisawa: 'A diagonal play at 24 is attractive, but then White would make a strong invasion at 'e'.'

Black 25. Otake: 'Black has no hope of success if he pushes through at 'f', cuts, and tries to fight.'

White 34. Fujisawa: 'I felt I had no choice about this move. If I played 1 in Dia. 2, then I'd have to answer Black 2 by extending to White 3, after which Black 4 would destroy



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

the future potential of my framework.'

White 36. Fujisawa: 'Some people — Takagawa, the official referee, for example — thought I should have played at 'g', but that idea didn't even occur to me during the game. Don't ask me which move is actually better; it's probably a question of individual preference.'

Otake: 'If White plays 'g', Black will jump to 39. That's what I should have done anyway, instead of making that detour at 37. I was a little worried that if I went directly to 1 in Dia. 3, White would play 2, but I should have accepted the result through Black 9 as fair. After jumping to 9, Black's center group is reasonably safe from attack.'



Dia. 3




Figure 2 (40 - 79)

Figure 2 (40 - 79). *Otake goes wrong.*

Black 49. Otake: 'I should have defended against the wedge at 50 by attaching at 60. I did not overlook White 50 but I underestimated its effectiveness.'

Black 53. Otake: 'This is where I lost the game. I had to connect at 1 in Dia. 4. When White plays 4, Black's push at 5 is a neat trick, and although Black still gets cut, he's not as hard up as in the actual game.'

Fujisawa: 'You're right. White unfortunately can't ignore Black 5 to grip the cutting stone with 1 in Dia. 5.'

Otake: 'Not unless he wants to get netted by Black 2 to 12.'

Black 55. Otake: 'Here again I should have played at 60. That leads to White 55, Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', which gives Black a safe shape.'

White 56. Fujisawa: 'I was quite pleased at cutting here.'

Otake: 'You should have been pleased at

making that clean a cut.'

White 58. Fujisawa: 'That was an annoying little jab, wasn't it?'

Black 61. Otake: 'Another lax move, and with bad aji. I should have hane'd at 'd'.'

Fujisawa: 'The bad aji is the sequence in Dia. 6. If Black plays as shown through 18, White gets the area to the right as territory in sente, which is superb.'

Otake: 'Which means that Black has to play 16 at 17 and fight it out.'

Fujisawa: 'But that enables White to start a ko by playing 16.'

Otake: 'Well, White loses liberties for his stones above, so he can't carry out this sequence immediately, but I'll admit that as a potential threat, it was a burden on Black.'

Note: In Dia. 6, if Black plays 8 at 'a', White can push through and cut with White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'.


Black 67. Otake: 'Although it risked losing profit, this clamp was probably called for because of its relation to the fighting in the center.'

White 70. Fujisawa: 'Switching the scene here was correct. White can't contain Black by attaching at 'e'; Black has a refutation with the thrust at 'f'.'


Black 75. Otake: 'Too passive - I should have drawn back at 'g'. I was feeling optimistic after having gotten to play 73, and I let up a little.'

White 76. Fujisawa: 'There was no way to attack the black group directly, but this move prepared for both war and peace.'

Black 79. Otake: 'I guess I should have reduced White's territory with 1 in Dia. 7. After Black 5, White will probably defend at 'a'.'




Dia. 4



Dia. 5

9: connects



Dia. 6




Figure 3 (80 - 120)


Figure 3 (80 - 120). Problems in the center

White 80. Fujisawa: 'Now it was my turn for a mistake. Later, when Black attached at 91, I didn't have a reply. I should have held back to 'a' instead of 80.'

Black 85. Otake: 'This was a funny time to connect. Why didn't I capture at 87? White couldn't give atari at 85, because Black would counter at 88, so White would have to draw back at 88 himself, after which Black 111, White 85, Black 82, White 86, Black 'b' would clearly give Black more profit than the actual result.'

White 92. Fujisawa: 'It's possible for White to play at 110 instead, but the aji is bad.'

Black 97. Otake: 'If Black plays 97 at 98,



Dia. 7

he can probably live, but there's no profit in it because his top right territory shrinks.'


White 104. Fujisawa: 'This was correctly timed. Black doesn't want to lose territory, so he'll block at 105, but later on, he might connect at 'c' instead.'

Note: White's connection at 106 affects the situation to the left.

White 108. Fujisawa: 'This move couldn't be helped.'

Note: If White omits it, Black can play 1 and 3 in Dia. 8. Next Black answers White 'a' at 'b', or White 'c' at 'a'.


Black 109. Otake: 'Black 110, White 'd', Black 'e' would get Black nicely connected, but then White would go into action at 'f' in the bottom left. Still, Black 109 was too passive. I should have invaded the top at 'g.'



Dia. 8

Note: For White 'f', see Dia. 6.

Black 113. Otake: 'The black center group was so full of seams and cracks that it was beyond my powers to figure out how to patch it up, but that doesn't excuse a fence-straddling move — neither offense or defense — like 113. I had to invade at 1 in Dia. 9. That would lead to a fight, starting with White's attaching at 2 and extending at 4, but regardless of the outcome, it was what I had to do.'



Dia. 9

White 116-120. Fujisawa: 'After this push-and-cut combination, I began to like my chances.'

Otake: 'That cut turned the heat on — really put Black in a tight spot.'




Figure 4 (121 - 160)

Figure 4 (121 - 160)

Black 29. Fujisawa: 'If Black doesn't play this forcing move now, then after Black 31 to 35, White 45 becomes severe.'

White 36. Otake: 'Once White cuts here, Black has lost the game.'


Fujisawa: 'Yes, I thought I was winning now.'

Otake: 'The attachment at Black 113 in Figure 3 was entirely out of place - an ill-timed sword clash if there ever was one.'

Black 39 Otake: 'This was a brainless way to connect. Perhaps I should have thrust at 'a'.'

Fujisawa: 'That wouldn't have been especially incisive either.'

Note: Although Black linked up with 43,



Dia. 10

White still had the diagonal attachment at 1 in Dia. 10 left. The resulting ko at 'a' is dangerous to both sides, but its existence as a threat makes Black's position difficult. Black cannot play 2 at 3 because of White 'b'.

White 46. Fujisawa: 'White can't be greedy and play 47, or Black 51, White 'b', Black 'c' will land him in trouble in no time. Black can descend at 'd' in sente, threatening to link to the right.'

White 58 and 60. Fujisawa: 'After getting in these two moves, I was able to relax.'

Otake: 'I lost the game on Black 53 and 55 in Figure 2 and Black 113 in Figure 3.'

Black resigns after White 200.

('Kido', April 1981. Translated by James Davies.)




Figure 5 (161 - 200)
65: connects

Game Four

Black: Fujisawa Shuko

White: Otake Hideo

komi: 5½

18th, 19th February at Niigata

Commentary from the *Yomiuri Shimbun*.

Figure 1 (1 - 45)

White 10-28. It is unusual to see a handicap joseki played in a high-level professional game, because in handicap josekis, Black generally accepts a less than optimal result in order to play simple, clear moves. That is held to be especially true of the joseki through White 28. One may wonder why Black chose such an apparently negative line of play.




Figure 1 (1 - 45)

Black 29 is the answer to the preceding question. This push expands Black's position so strongly that Otake speculated that perhaps he should have played White 22 at 29.

Black 33 is somewhat crude, but good in this situation. Black builds a wall in sente, then takes the big point at 41.

Black 45. Opinions were divided about this move. Although large in scale, it is weak territorially. Anyway, once Black constructs a framework of this size, White has no choice but to invade it, as he does with his next stone.





Figure 2 (46 - 86)

Figure 2 (46 - 86)

Black 63-71. Black seems to be in command of the game, but before playing 71 -


Dia. 1. He should have exchanged 1 for 2.



Dia. 1

This exchange safeguards the corner in the event of White A, Black B, White C, making it alive as it stands. Without the 1-2 exchange, after A-B-C, White D kills the corner. If Black plays 1 after A-B-C, White can ignore it, since White C has given him an extra half eye.

Black 75 is necessary.



Dia. 2


12: takes ko

Dia. 2. Suppose Black plays 1 instead. White attacks with 2 to 8, obtaining a ko. Then he not only wins the ko with White 14, but lives in the corner with 16 to 24.

White 78. Yamabe 9-dan pointed out that White could have played 'a'. If Black tries to save his three cutting stones, he loses the corner. For example: Black 'b', White 78, Black 82, White 84, Black 'c', White 'd'.

White 86. After the game, Otake wished he had made a different nose attachment.

Dia. 3. Otake wished he had played White 1. The result through 9 is like what happens in Figure 3 - a trade of small groups - except that White 3, 5, and 7 go far toward nullifying Black's center thickness.



Dia. 3




Figure 3 (87 – 119)

Figure 3 (87 – 119)

Black 99 keeps White from playing a double hane and starting a ko: White 99, Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'.

Black 101–105 are forcing moves. Instead of submitting to them, White would like to attack at 'e', but after Black 'f', White 'g', Black 'h', the ladder is unfavorable. Go Seigen suggested that White play 'i' and try to set the ladder up.

Black 119. The game is close; Black plays aggressively, seeking to decide it. If he defends at 'j' instead, he may well lose.





Figure 4 (120 – 150)


Figure 4 (120 – 150)

White 32. Otake pondered this move for nearly an hour. Other professionals spent the time exploring variations in the next room.



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Ishida 9-dan suggested capturing at 1. Ishida: 'After Black 18, counting White A–Black B–White C and Black D–White E–Black F as miai, Black has 72 points of territory and White has 64. That puts Black 8 points ahead on the board, but it's White's turn. If White can play G in sente, next he has the hane at H. The game is roughly even.'



Dia. 5

Dia. 5. Another variation explored was this one. White captures three stones with 3, Black breaks up the top with 6, and White attacks at 7. The possibility of White 7 is the reason why White has refrained so far from playing White A, Black 7, White B.

Black 33 avoids Dia. 5.

Black 41. The last large point. Black's playing here may have settled the outcome.

White 46 is good, but before taking this stone, White could have taken some profit in the center with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

White 50 prevents Black 50.




Figure 5 (151 – 201)

92: captures 91

Figure 5 (151 – 201)

On the board, White is nearly fifteen points behind at the end.

White resigns at Black 201.

(Translated by James Davies)

An Interview with Fujisawa Shuko

Shortly after he won the NHK Cup, Shuko was interviewed by an NHK reporter. Below are some extracts.

Reporter: Recently your son Kazunari qualified as shodan with good results in the insei tournament.

Shuko: Apparently he had the best results. I don't give him any special instruction, but he is studying really hard. It mightn't be my place as his parent to say this, but he seems to have genuine talent.

NHK: Will we see a second-generation Kisei?

Shuko: I don't know about that, but he might become a top player.

NHK: How did you study go when you were young?

Shuko: I didn't get any teaching games with senior players, but that's how it was then. You might get one game (with your teacher) when you became shodan, but for the rest you had to study by yourself. I didn't have a teacher — I studied by playing through the games of the past. It's the same now. I'm always drinking during the daytime, so people think I'm a hopeless drunkard, but however much I drink, I wake up on the dot at four in the morning ... and play through games. I probably study more than anyone else. I study

all the games from most of the tournaments, spending about two hours going through one game. ... I'm always telling the young players to study until they collapse from exhaustion. When I ask them how many hours a day they put in, they tell me five hours, six hours, but that's not enough. When I was young, I really studied until I was ready to drop...

NHK: Do you study the classic games?

Shuko: Yes, every day.

NHK: Whom do you like?

Shuko: I like Shuei Honinbo (1852 – 1907). He was strong. I think he was the strongest of the Meijins and Honinbos. There were many strong players, like Shusaku and Shusai, but I definitely think that he was stronger than those two.

NHK: What were his strong points?

Shuko: I've played through his games many times. He had superb positional judgement. There's nothing unnatural in the flow of his moves, they are well-balanced. No matter how often I go through his games, I always have the feeling that I'd be no match for him...

NHK: Good positional judgement, thick style — he resembles you.

Shuko: Perhaps. I'm far below his level, but I like his go. The brilliance of his play from the fuseki to the middle game is outstanding...

NHK: Winning this Kisei title match four straight shows impressive strength.

Shuko: Well, the match wasn't a fair indication of Otake's strength. I was impressed with his fighting ability, his tenacity in the in-fighting. I was lucky. I did well in the first game, but the third game was close to flawless. Even when I replay it now, I feel that it was a magnificent game — I didn't play one bad move. That rarely happens. That was the crucial game of the series...

NHK: There are a lot of players following close on your heels, Otake and the others.

Shuko: Well, Otake and Kato stand out ... Rin could easily become the challenger and recently Takemiya seems to have gained some understanding of the game. The toughest opponent of the lot might be Cho Chikun. He's still a duffer though (laughs). Doesn't matter who becomes the challenger, there's no one who's a match for me. Whoever it is, I'll crush them all. Their go is still on a different level. The strongest player in the go world today is me, Shuko the champion. Ha ha ha.

